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ABSTRACT—The law governing police interrogation provides perverse 
incentives. For criminal suspects, the law rewards obstruction and 
concealment. For police officers, it honors deceit and psychological 
aggression. For the courts and the rest of us, it encourages blindness and 
rationalization. This Article contends that the law could help foster better 
behaviors. The law could incentivize criminals to confess without police 
trickery and oppression. It could motivate police officers involved in 
obtaining suspect statements to avoid chicanery and duress. And, it could 
summon courts and the rest of us to speak more truthfully about whether 
suspect admissions are the product of informed, intelligent, and voluntary 
decisions. States could promote these outcomes by providing valuable 
sentencing concessions to those who confess. 
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The law of police interrogation and confessions serves some terrible 
ends. It goes far to protect noncooperation and cover-up by the most 
knowledgeable, cunning, and steely criminals, while providing only 
minimal safeguards for those who are uneducated, unintelligent, or easily 
coerced.1 It permits police officers to use trickery, harassment, and the 
inducement of despair to extract statements from vulnerable persons, 
prohibiting only the most abusive and offensive interrogation tactics.2 It 
 
1 See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 286 
(1996) (empirical study finding that “a suspect with a felony record in my sample was almost four times 
as likely to invoke his Miranda rights as a suspect with no prior record”); William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s 
Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 977 (2001) (noting that “[t]he most vulnerable suspects, which includes 
those with the least experience dealing with the system, are helped, if at all, only indirectly”). 
2 See generally RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 119–64 (2008) 
(making the case that “police interrogators resort to manipulation, deception, and fraud to secure 
admissions . . . because they view themselves as agents of the prosecution and thus the suspect’s 
adversary”); see also DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 199 (1991) (“With 
rare exception, a confession is compelled, provoked and manipulated from a suspect by a detective who 
has been trained in a genuinely deceitful art.”); Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of 
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invites courts and the rest of us to declare the irrational or inveigled 
decisions of arrestees to talk to police as “knowing,” “intelligent,” and 
“voluntary,”3 torturing the meaning of these words that signify the 
admissibility of suspect statements.4 The law in this area facilitates bad 
behavior all around. 
These problems arise from the conflicting efforts by the Supreme 
Court to both honor and minimize constitutional restrictions on police 
interrogation. The central limit is the Fifth Amendment provision that “[n]o 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”5 The Supreme Court has long said that this prohibition governs 
police interrogation that occurs after an arrest but before the initiation of 
adversarial judicial proceedings.6 On this view,7 the Court held in Miranda 
v. Arizona8 that arrestees must receive a warning about their Fifth 
Amendment rights to silence and to counsel9 (the latter created by 
Miranda) and must waive those rights for the government to introduce at 
trial their statements resulting from police interrogation.10 An arrestee’s 
claim of either of these Fifth Amendment rights after the provision of 
Miranda warnings requires the police to cease interrogation.11 Likewise, an 
assertion of either of the rights in the face of Miranda warnings provides no 
basis for an inference of guilt at trial.12 These rules aim to honor the Fifth 
 
False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 919 (2004) (asserting that “[t]he 
genius or mind trick of modern interrogation is that it makes the irrational (admitting to a crime that 
will likely lead to punishment) appear rational.”). 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring the government to demonstrate that the 
defendant waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel 
“voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently”). 
4 See Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—And the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 700 (1988) (“Any expectation that truly voluntary 
confessions are available on a systemic basis depends either on unsupportable factual assumptions or on 
an interpretation of voluntariness that reduces that word to signifying no more than the absence of third 
degree methods.”). 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
6 See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). For the view that the Court correctly 
decided Bram, see Lawrence Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda is Not Prophylactic and the 
Constitution is Not Perfect, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 579, 588–90 (2007). 
7 The Court also had said that the privilege applies against the states through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
8 384 U.S. at 436. 
9 See id. at 444 (“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain 
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to 
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”). 
10 See id. at 475. 
11 See id. at 474. 
12 See id. at 468 n.37. 
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Amendment by protecting those arrestees who stand on the Constitution 
and remain silent. 
At the same time, from the day it announced Miranda, the Court 
began minimizing the significance of the decision in excluding suspect 
statements and controlling police interrogation.13 For example, the Miranda 
Court itself mandated only a confusing and misleading warning that was of 
no help to suspects in understanding the consequences of their choices.14 
Soon, the Court also said that the government can introduce a criminal 
defendant’s statement obtained in violation of Miranda to impeach his 
testimony at trial.15 Likewise, the Justices ruled that even when the police 
violate Miranda, at trial the government can still use a witness discovered 
as a fruit of the defendant’s statements.16 The Court also held that police 
and courts can ignore Miranda when justified by considerations of public 
safety.17 These rulings, and others, render Miranda doctrine insignificant in 
all but arbitrarily narrow circumstances.18 
The Court’s conflicted approach to police interrogation results in part 
from the Fifth Amendment privilege’s effect as applied during the formal 
adjudication process. In the courtroom, the criminal defendant has an 
absolute right not to testify, and the prosecutor and judge must avoid 
suggesting that the jury draw an inference of guilt from his silence.19 These 
doctrines, unavailable in many civilized countries,20 lead to tension over 
how the privilege should apply to police interrogation. On the one hand, the 
existence of these highly protective rules during the adjudicative process 
seems to call for their extension back at least to the point of detention, lest 
the police be able to render them largely meaningless by testifying before 
 
13 For the view that Miranda “is best characterized as a retreat from the promise of liberal 
individualism brilliantly camouflaged under the cover of bold advance,” see Louis Michael Seidman, 
Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 744 (1992). 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 184–190. 
15 See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (failure to cease questioning after assertion of 
rights); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224–26 (1971) (failure to provide warnings). 
16 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974) (permitting testimony from a witness 
discovered from an unwarned statement). 
17 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984). 
18 See Richard A. Leo & K. Alexa Koenig, The Gatehouses and Mansions: Fifty Years Later, 
6 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 323, 335–36 (2010) (noting that Miranda protects only in the rare case 
where the suspect invokes one or the other rights and police honor the decision). 
19 See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965); see also Mitchell v. United States, 
526 U.S. 314, 328–29 (1999) (holding that a trial court may not draw adverse inference about facts of 
crime that bear on sentencing based on defendant’s failure to testify at sentencing hearing). 
20 See Jeffrey Bellin, Reconceptualizing the Fifth Amendment Prohibition of Adverse Comment on 
Criminal Defendants’ Trial Silence, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 229, 248 n.73 (2010) (noting that the adverse 
inference is permitted, for example, in England, France, Israel, and Singapore). 
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the jury about a suspect’s compelled statements or refusal to cooperate.21 
On the other hand, the thorough protection the privilege affords the accused 
during the adjudicative process puts great pressure on the police to try to 
extract incriminating statements from the accused before courthouse 
proceedings begin and on judges to allow those statements as evidence 
against the accused.22 After all, the suspect’s statements to the authorities 
often are critical to the prosecution proving guilt and, as things currently 
stand, the suspect will not make statements to the authorities, absent a plea 
deal, once he arrives at court, secures a lawyer, and has the benefit of the 
privilege.23 
The conflict over police interrogation, in turn, has fostered arcane 
rules that provide wrong-headed inducements for those sophisticated 
enough to understand them. The Miranda rulings honoring the Fifth 
Amendment reward resistance and recalcitrance by guileful arrestees 
sufficiently knowledgeable about them.24 At the same time, the loopholes in 
Miranda and related interrogation laws invite well-trained police officers to 
take advantage of susceptible suspects through exploitative tactics.25 
Because Miranda doctrine professes to serve constitutional values but is 
empty of much protection for detainees, it also enables courts to purport to 
protect vulnerable suspects while allowing as evidence against them their 
statements to the police that any competent criminal defense lawyer would 
have advised them not to make.26 All of this behavior—by criminal 
suspects, by the police, and by the courts—is unbefitting a legal system that 
aims to promote “dignity,” “integrity,” and governmental legitimacy.27 
We should ask how the law of police interrogation could promote 
more honorable conduct from everyone involved. Could the law encourage 
those who have committed crimes to self-incriminate to the authorities? 
Could it help influence the police to treat detainees without deceitfulness 
even while eliciting and recording their admissions? Could it summon 
 
21 See Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal 
Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from Escobedo to . . . , in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1, 19 
(A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965). 
22 See id. at 25. 
23 See id. 
24 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
25 See, e.g., Leo & Koenig, supra note 18, at 329–30; Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 
84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 132–36 (1998). 
26 See Kamisar, supra note 21, at 37–38 (concluding that competent defense counsel will not advise 
self-incrimination over standing on the privilege absent an enforceable bargain from the government); 
Seidman, supra note 13, at 741 (noting that a suspect’s interaction with a defense lawyer at the 
interrogation stage “is certain to create a context in which the defendant will remain silent”). 
27 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). 
HOWE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2016 11:29 AM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
910 
courts to speak more candidly about whether the decisions of suspects to 
talk to the police are the kinds of choices they plausibly would make even 
with the assistance of counsel? Prevailing discourse about interrogation law 
has puzzlingly not posed these kinds of questions. 
This Article contends that the central but largely overlooked problem 
with Fifth Amendment interrogation doctrine is its focus on the prevention 
or suppression of suspect statements. The Supreme Court and 
commentators have long been stuck in a debate that assumes that honoring 
Fifth Amendment protections in this context depends entirely on reducing 
suspect admissions and on excluding evidence of them from criminal trials. 
The conundrum is that success by this measure means greatly hampering 
law enforcement efforts or else “sorting”28 irrationally among many 
suspects who all deserve protection. As things currently stand, virtually 
every self-incriminating statement elicited through custodial police 
interrogation is plausibly viewed as “compelled” under the Fifth 
Amendment.29 The Supreme Court endorsed that perspective as the basis 
for Miranda.30 Consequently, if the only remedy is prevention or 
suppression of those statements, any effort to prevent or suppress all of 
them will be unpalatable and any effort to distinguish among defendants to 
prevent or suppress only a few of them will seem arbitrary. In this latter 
scenario, such an effort may also perversely incentivize those suspects, 
police officers, and judges who know the sorting rules. 
This Article advocates that states confront the dilemma by providing a 
sentencing concession to custodial suspects who self-incriminate.31 By 
“concession” I mean a reduction in sentence severity.32 The Supreme Court 
almost certainly will not find the Fifth Amendment to mandate this 
approach.33 However, the Miranda doctrine underenforces the Fifth 
Amendment privilege,34 and legislatures can and should provide a remedy 
 
28 Stuntz, supra note 1, at 991 (describing Miranda as allowing suspects to do the “sorting”). 
29 See infra Section I.B. 
30 See infra text accompanying notes 78–93. 
31 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 995 (“Regulating police interrogation in ways that avoid distributive 
injustice may be possible if the law can do two things at once: maximize the number of suspects who 
talk to the police, while minimizing the frequency with which police use abusive interrogation 
tactics.”). 
32 For more on the nature of the concessions I propose, see infra note 290 and Section IV.C.3. 
33 The approach that this Article recommends reflects a compromise that may seem more 
appropriately grounded in legislation than in a constitutional mandate. See infra text accompanying 
notes 297–308. 
34 See infra Section II.A. 
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to honor the constitutional right in those circumstances.35 In particular, 
states could pass legislation that would require that a custodial suspect 
whose statement to the police or its fruits would be admitted against him at 
trial receive a sentence after conviction, whether on a guilty plea or at trial, 
that is proportionally reduced from what it would otherwise have been. The 
effect would be to reward those who self-incriminate to the police to their 
detriment.36 Suspects would still face conviction and, in serious cases, a 
substantial sentence when their statements to the police tend to demonstrate 
their guilt. At the same time, the proposal would help encourage suspects to 
voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement, the police to avoid deceiving 
suspects to get them to talk, and the courts to speak with greater candor 
about suspects’ decisions to self-incriminate. 
This Article proceeds in four stages to demonstrate why legislatures 
should use sentencing concessions to balance the desire to secure suspect 
statements to the police with the need to respect the Fifth Amendment. 
Part I briefly reprises and assesses the view of the Miranda Court that 
custodial interrogation contains inherent pressures that create a great risk of 
“compelled” self-incrimination. This Article urges this view as persuasive 
if the understanding of the Fifth Amendment privilege is to protect free and 
rational choice by the suspect in custody on whether to become a witness,37 
which is how I contend the Court understands the Fifth Amendment to 
apply in the formal adjudication of a criminal case. 
With this view of the privilege in mind, Part II summarizes the 
conventional, anticonfessional perspective on Miranda’s failure. The 
unifying theme of prevailing critiques is that the Miranda safeguards have 
not prevented or suppressed enough self-incriminating statements. These 
critiques favor alternative safeguards that would prevent and suppress more 
of them. The proposals include tinkering with the Miranda rules to make 
them more favorable to the defense, electronic recording of police 
interrogation sessions, requiring defense counsel’s presence prior to and 
during any police questioning, judicial interrogation instead of police 
interrogation, and a return to a fortified due process test of “voluntariness” 
alone. 
Part III of this Article proposes an entirely different perspective on 
Miranda’s failure, one that is pro-confessional. This critique claims that the 
 
35 For more on the notion that the Supreme Court will sometimes not fully enforce the Constitution 
due to features of the judicial process but that these institutional inhibitions on the Court do not reflect 
the substantive boundaries of the Constitution, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal 
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1214–15 (1978). 
36 See infra text accompanying notes 314–340. 
37 See infra notes 124–134 and accompanying text. 
HOWE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2016 11:29 AM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
912 
Miranda doctrine failed not because it did not adequately prevent and 
suppress but because it focused on prevention and suppression in the first 
place. If virtually all admissions by custodial suspects to the police, absent 
concessions, are compelled, no rules about prevention or suppression can 
satisfy us. We will either turn our backs on too much helpful evidence of 
guilt to meet our desire for effective law enforcement or else use arbitrary 
rules about which admissions the government can use, and those rules may 
incentivize perverse behavior. To demonstrate, this Part explains why the 
rules that the Miranda doctrine imposed—both originally and as modified 
by the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts—have achieved unsatisfying 
results. They have not only failed to honor the view of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege presented by the Miranda Court, but have 
incentivized bad behavior by suspects, police, and courts. This Part also 
explains why the alternative doctrines that commentators have commonly 
proposed would also achieve undesirable outcomes. Because these 
alternative proposals also depend on suppression, they cannot avoid a 
heavy tradeoff between honoring the Fifth Amendment and succeeding in 
prosecuting crime. 
Part IV of this Article explains the proposal for a better compromise—
legislation authorizing sentencing concessions to supplement the Miranda 
doctrine. These concessions might provide less of a benefit to some 
suspects than prevention or suppression of their admissions, but they would 
apply to a greater breadth of suspects. The concessions would help 
compensate custodial suspects who self-incriminate to the police. The 
concessions could also dissuade police officers from interviewing a 
suspect, but only when the government does not need the suspect’s self-
incriminating statement. This Part also focuses on the formal notice that 
police officers could provide to suspects regarding the sentencing 
concessions. Along with the concessions themselves, the notice would 
encourage suspects to talk, reduce the need for the police to employ 
deceitful or threatening interrogation tactics, and enable courts to speak 
more honestly about the fairness of the interrogation process. If properly 
presented as an addition to the Miranda warnings, this notice could survive 
constitutional challenge. 
I. POLICE INTERROGATION AS COMPULSION 
In this Part, I recount and assess the claim of the Miranda Court that 
custodial police interrogation involves inherent pressures that, absent 
safeguards, render almost all resulting statements “compelled” within the 
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meaning of the Fifth Amendment.38 The Miranda Court viewed compulsion 
as “pressure” placed on a custodial suspect by the government that 
“disable[s] him from making a free and rational choice” about whether to 
talk or remain silent.39 The Court also concluded that “free and rational 
choice” required a suspect to be apprised of his rights and of the 
consequences of foregoing them.40 There must be an “assurance of real 
understanding.”41 Based on this view, the Court declared that unrestricted 
police interrogation resulting in self-incrimination virtually always violates 
the privilege.42 If we accept the Court’s view of compulsion, I urge that we 
should also accept this latter conclusion. 
A. The Meaning of Compulsion During Adjudication 
The Miranda majority’s view about the meaning of compulsion at the 
interrogation stage corresponds to how the Court has applied the Fifth 
Amendment privilege in the formal adjudication phases of a criminal case. 
At a criminal trial, the defendant has a right to abstain from even taking the 
stand to assert the privilege.43 “The right of the defendant is not only to 
avoid being compelled to give incriminating responses to particular 
inquiries, but to resist being placed in a position where the inquiries can be 
put to him while he is under oath.”44 This right continues at sentencing and 
survives even if the defendant previously waived it by pleading guilty.45 
The defendant also has the right to the assistance of counsel at trial and 
sentencing to help the defendant understand the consequences of testifying 
or remaining silent and which of these options would better serve the 
 
38 See 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (“We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of 
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling 
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he 
would not otherwise do so freely.”); see also Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1519, 1522 (2008) (“The Court’s first premise was that the process of custodial interrogation 
contains inherent pressures that compel suspects to speak.”). 
39 384 U.S. at 464–65. 
40 See id. at 468 (“For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them 
aware of it—the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise.”). 
41 Id. at 469. 
42 See id. at 478. 
43 Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155–56 (1958) (declaring that a criminal defendant at his 
own trial “has the choice, after weighing the advantage of the privilege against self-incrimination 
against the advantage of putting forward his version of the facts and his reliability as a witness, not to 
testify at all”). 
44 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.5(a), at 1162 (5th ed. 2009). 
45 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 316 (1999). 
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defendant’s interests.46 These substantial protections reflect the notion that 
the Fifth Amendment privilege aims to ensure that a person facing criminal 
prosecution can make a free and rational choice.  
Consistent with this perspective, the Court has concluded that the state 
generally may not impose any significant penalty on a criminal defendant 
for electing not to testify. Only a year before Miranda, in Griffin v. 
California,47 the Court ruled that neither a prosecutor nor a trial judge can 
suggest to a jury that it may draw an adverse inference from the failure of a 
criminal defendant to testify, even as to facts within the defendant’s 
knowledge.48 According to the Court, comment on the defendant’s silence 
would constitute “a penalty imposed . . . for exercising a constitutional 
privilege” because “[i]t cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion 
costly.”49 The Court rejected the claim that the jury would naturally draw 
the inference anyway.50 It said that “[w]hat the jury may infer, given no 
help from the court, is one thing” while “[w]hat it may infer when the court 
solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite 
another.”51 
The Court also extended the Griffin rule to sentencing hearings in 
Mitchell v. United States.52 There, the trial court found at sentencing that 
Mitchell “had been a drug courier on a regular basis,” thus putting her over 
the five-kilogram sales threshold that subjected her to a minimum sentence 
of ten years imprisonment.53 The judge relied in part on an inference from 
Mitchell’s failure to testify at trial or at sentencing.54 Over a spirited 
dissent,55 a five-Justice majority held the adverse inference was a violation 
 
46 See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (holding that the Gideon rule applies to 
any case in which incarceration is imposed, even in the form of a suspended sentence); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (establishing that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for a 
felony prosecution applies to the states); see also Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) 
(holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel at sentencing). 
47 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
48 See id. at 609–13. 
49 Id. at 614. 
50 Id. at 614–15. In a subsequent decision, the Court said that a judge must, upon defense request, 
instruct the jury that it may not consider the defendant’s silence as evidence of guilt. See Carter v. 
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981). 
51 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614. 
52 526 U.S. 314, 316–17 (1999). 
53 See id. at 319. 
54 At sentencing, the district judge said to the defendant: “I held it against you that you didn’t come 
forward today and tell me that you really only did this a couple of times . . . .” Id. 
55 See id. at 331–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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of the Griffin rule,56 calling it “an impermissible burden on the exercise of 
the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination.”57 
The no-adverse-inference rule is highly protective of criminal 
defendants. Many commentators have criticized it,58 urging, for example, 
that it is “out of sync with the historical understanding of the Fifth 
Amendment”59 or, on policy grounds, that it is too broad in protecting 
defendants even when the inference is entirely logical.60 Its survival 
underscores the Court’s view that the state may do little in the way of 
penalizing defendants to persuade them to testify during formal 
adjudication.61 
While the state need not eliminate every inconvenience for the 
defendant in deciding whether to remain silent, any burdens imposed must 
be “supported by the legitimate ends of procedural efficacy.”62 The state, 
for example, can “force the defendant to make his choice as to whether to 
testify before he has a jury evaluation of the strength of the prosecution’s 
 
56 See id. at 330 (majority opinion). 
57 Id. 
58 See, e.g., id. at 332–33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that Griffin lacked historical 
justification as an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 620 
(1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (contending that adverse comment was not of the same nature as “that 
involved in the procedures which historically gave rise to the Fifth Amendment guarantee”); Donald B. 
Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. California After Fifteen 
Years, 78 MICH. L. REV. 841, 847 (1980) (contending that “the weight” of the burden imposed by 
adverse comment was not sufficient to justify the Griffin rule); Bellin, supra note 20, at 234 
(contending that the no-adverse-comment prohibition can be justified only if greatly narrowed); Mark 
Berger, Of Policy, Politics, and Parliament: The Legislative Rewriting of the British Right to Silence, 
22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 391, 426–27 (1995) (contending that there is no evidentiary reason why the adverse 
inference should be disallowed); Anne Bowen Poulin, Evidentiary Use of Silence and the Constitutional 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 52 GEO. WASH. L REV. 191, 236 (1984) (contending that Griffin 
was poorly justified given that the jury would draw the adverse inference anyway). 
59 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
60 See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 20, at 234–37. 
61 The exceptions arise if the defendant tries to invoke the privilege selectively or to suggest, 
without testifying, that his testimony would support the defense. An accused who testifies may not 
avoid cross-examination “on matters raised by her own testimony on direct examination.” Brown v. 
United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958). Likewise, if the defense lawyer gives an opening statement 
that summarizes the planned defense and states that the defendant will take the stand, the prosecution 
may note before the jury that its case was “unrefuted” and “uncontradicted.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586, 594–95 (1978). Similarly, if the defense lawyer asserts in argument that the government never 
permitted the defendant to give his version of events, the prosecution can respond before the jury that 
the defendant was permitted to take the stand to testify. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31 
(1988). In cases like Lockett and Robinson, the government comments are deemed to function not as 
way of highlighting “substantive evidence of guilt” but as a “fair response” to the unfair claims by 
defense counsel. See Robinson, 485 U.S. at 32. 
62 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 44, at 1163. 
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case-in-chief.”63 Likewise, where unitary jury trials on guilt or innocence 
and sentencing are the rule, the state generally need not provide bifurcated 
proceedings for the defendant who wants to avoid testifying on his guilt or 
innocence but wants to testify on his sentencing.64 At the same time, the 
Court has rejected a requirement that a defendant must testify before any 
other testimony for the defense is heard.65 In those circumstances, the 
state’s interest in limiting perjury cannot justify66 the burden placed on the 
defendant’s “freedom of choice.”67 
In the context of plea bargaining, the state also may not impair the 
defendant’s freedom of choice. The state can provide inducements in the 
form of sentencing concessions to encourage the defendant to plead guilty, 
but it cannot, for example, lie about the evidence or fail to adhere to its 
promises.68 The traditional view that prosecutors have discretion not to 
pursue the most severe charges also means that, when prosecutors have 
originally charged leniently, they can try to induce a guilty plea by advising 
the defendant that they will pursue the higher charges if he does not accept 
the offer.69 Nonetheless, the higher charges must be legitimate,70 and they 
must be “openly presented”71 to the defendant “so that he knows precisely 
his choices.”72 
To waive the privilege and accept a plea bargain, the defendant must 
also receive some basic information about the consequences. He must 
receive an explanation of the charge to which he is pleading guilty either 
from the trial court or from defense counsel such that he has “notice of 
what he is being asked to admit.”73 Likewise, he must be apprised of the 
 
63 Id. 
64 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 216 (1971) (noting an exception for certain capital 
sentencing proceedings). 
65 In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), the Court concluded that such a rule violates the 
Fifth Amendment privilege, noting that the defendant “may not know at the close of the State’s case 
whether his own testimony will be necessary or even helpful to his cause.” Id. at 610–12. 
66 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 44, at 1163. 
67 Brooks, 406 U.S. at 608. 
68 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) (stating that “absent misrepresentation or 
other impermissible conduct by state agents . . . a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light 
of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the 
plea rested on a faulty premise”). 
69 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978). 
70 See id. at 364 (“It is not disputed here that Hayes was properly chargeable under the recidivist 
statute . . . .”). 
71 See id. at 365. 
72 CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS 
OF CASES AND CONCEPTS § 26.02, at 729 (5th ed. 2008). 
73 Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976). 
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sentencing possibilities that result from his guilty plea.74 In addition, he 
must be informed of certain, significant collateral consequences that could 
result, such as if the plea would subject him to automatic deportation.75 
More generally, in deciding on the best course between accepting a plea 
agreement and forcing the government to prove its case, the defendant is 
entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.76 These rules confirm that 
compulsion in the adjudication stages is not simply governmental tactics so 
offensive as to equate with “coercion” but something less sinister—
pressure by the government under circumstances that deprive a defendant 
of free and rational choice in deciding whether to speak or remain silent.77 
B. The Risk of Compulsion Through Police Interrogation 
The Miranda Court’s view of compulsion was crucial to its conclusion 
that custodial interrogation by the police, absent safeguards, always 
jeopardizes the Fifth Amendment privilege.78 The Court had not previously 
endorsed this notion.79 Nearly seven decades earlier, in Bram v. United 
States,80 the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment privilege governs police 
interrogation.81 Language in the Bram opinion also suggested that rather 
minor pressure from the police could render a suspect’s statement 
“compelled” for Fifth Amendment purposes.82 Nonetheless, the Bram Court 
 
74 See, e.g., Williams v. Smith 591 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1979). 
75 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2010) (finding erroneous advice given by 
defense counsel regarding immigration consequences of guilty plea to constitute ineffective assistance). 
76 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 
(2012). 
77 See Dripps, supra note 4, at 703–04 (describing rules on guilty pleas as demanding that the 
accused have “a complete understanding of the consequences and alternatives,” and thereby recognizing 
that “[o]nly a rational person, free from pressures inconsistent with the dignity of rational persons, is 
responsible”). 
78 See 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (“To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected 
to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.”). 
79 Police interrogation did not involve “legal” compulsion. See Seidman, supra note 13, at 737. 
Legal compulsion would seem to involve the power to impose a legal punishment, such as a conviction 
for contempt. See id. However, the Court before Miranda had already proscribed some punishments for 
the exercise of the privilege during formal adjudication that were informal, such as comment before the 
jury by the prosecutor or judge. See supra notes 47–57 and accompanying text. 
80 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
81 See id. at 542. 
82 The Court asserted that when a person in police detention, like Bram, was advised that he was 
accused of a crime by another suspect, “the result was to produce upon his mind the fear that if he 
remained silent it would be considered an admission of guilt, and therefore render certain his being 
committed for trial as the guilty person.” Id. at 562. The Court also concluded that “it cannot be 
conceived that the converse impression would not also have naturally arisen, that by denying[,] there 
was hope of removing the suspicion from himself.” Id. The “self-evident” deduction was that “the mind 
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emphasized that a confession was not necessarily compelled in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment, and therefore inadmissible, merely because it was 
“made to a police officer, while the accused was under arrest in or out of 
prison, or was drawn out by his questions.”83 For the next half century, the 
Court also generally ignored the Fifth Amendment privilege as it applied to 
police interrogation,84 turning instead to the Due Process Clause as the 
primary basis for regulation.85 This trend arguably reflected doubt by the 
Court that it had properly applied the privilege to police interrogation in 
Bram.86 Yet, two years before Miranda, in Malloy v. Hogan,87 the Court 
seemed to reinvigorate the Bram notion that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
governed police interrogation.88 Miranda confirmed this about-face,89 but 
also went well beyond Bram by declaring that custodial police questioning 
posed an inherent risk of producing compelled statements.90 This view 
commanded only five votes among the Justices91 and was highly 
 
of one who is held in custody under suspicion of having committed a crime, would . . . be impelled to 
say something, when informed by one in authority” that there was this sort of evidence against him. Id. 
at 563. The Bram Court also noted other coercive circumstances surrounding Bram’s self-incriminating 
statements, such as that he had been stripped naked and was questioned when alone with a detective. 
See id. at 561–62. These factors, along with the confrontational nature of the interrogation, meant that 
the Court could rule Bram’s statements inadmissible without holding that all custodial questioning 
would amount to compulsion under the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
83 Id. at 558. 
84 See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 525 n.x (14th ed. 2015) (“Until the 
1960’s Bram had become a largely forgotten case . . . .”). 
85 See, e.g., Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2197 (1996) 
(noting the “constitutional reign of thirty years” for the due process voluntariness test before Miranda 
supplanted it as “the preeminent source of confession doctrine”). 
86 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 506 n.2 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting 
that Wigmore had “disproved” the “historical premises” for applying the privilege to police 
interrogation in Bram and that some of the Court’s subsequent decisions “cast further doubt” on the 
decision, although dicta in other decisions assumed the relevance of the privilege to police 
interrogation). 
87 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
88 The Court declared that “today the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal prosecution is 
tested by the same standard applied in federal prosecutions since 1897, when, in Bram v. United States, 
the Court held that ‘[i]n criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question arises 
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by [the privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination in] the Fifth Amendment.’” Id. at 7 (first alteration in original) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Bram, 168 U.S. at 542). 
89 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 510 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (calling the Court’s “asserted reliance on 
the Fifth Amendment” a “trompe l’oeil” and contending that its opinion “reveals no adequate basis for 
extending the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination to the police station”). 
90 See id. at 467 (“We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody 
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures . . . .”). 
91 See id. at 499 (Clark, J., dissenting in three of the cases and concurring in the result in the fourth 
case); id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart & White, JJ.); id. at 526 (White, J., dissenting, 
joined by Harlan & Stewart, JJ.). 
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controversial with the public.92 However, it followed logically from the 
application of the Fifth Amendment privilege to police interrogation if one 
understood compulsion to mean what it meant during formal adjudication.93 
Acceptance by the Miranda Court of this broad notion of compulsion 
helps explain why the majority would have wanted to turn back to the 
privilege to regulate interrogation. Commentators have noted that the old 
due process voluntariness test was too ambiguous to guide police officers 
or lower courts and that the Supreme Court itself seemed unable to settle on 
its meaning.94 However, the more specific problem apparently was that the 
Court did not think that the notion of “coercion” under due process could 
bear the same meaning as compulsion under the privilege. Whatever the 
ambiguities that existed over how to articulate and apply the due process 
test, the Miranda Court apparently accepted that there was insufficient 
consensus for applying it other than to circumstances involving unusually 
vulnerable suspects and especially offensive police behavior.95 In contrast, 
the majority must have believed there was a broader consensus to 
understand the Fifth Amendment privilege as justifying stricter regulation. 
The idea that the privilege required “free and rational choice”96 reflected 
more concern with the pressure imposed on the mental processes of almost 
all detainees facing custodial police interrogation.97 Unless the Court 
 
92 See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 167 (Sanford Levinson rev. 
5th ed. 2010) (asserting that Miranda was “[u]ndoubtedly the most controversial decision” of the 
Warren Court in the area of criminal justice); see also Leo & Koenig, supra note 18, at 329 (“From the 
day it was decided, Miranda was intensely controversial.”); A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and 
Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 262 (1968) (“The case which seemed to galvanize 
opposition into a potent political force was the Miranda decision . . . .”); Seidman, supra note 13, at 674 
(asserting that Miranda, along with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), were “two of 
the most controversial judicial opinions of the twentieth century”). 
93 See supra Section I.A. 
94 See, e.g., Hancock, supra note 85, at 2237; Seidman, supra note 13, at 730–32; Geoffrey R. 
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 102–03 (1977); cf. George 
C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1989 (2004) (noting that “courts are 
always balancing two different goals when applying the voluntariness test: protecting the suspect’s free 
will and preventing police misconduct” and, if they wish to support the admission into evidence of a 
confession, can typically focus on whichever of the two goals favors that conclusion). 
95 See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[I]t must be frankly recognized . . . 
that police questioning allowable under due process precedents may inherently entail some pressure on 
the suspect and may seek advantage in his ignorance or weaknesses.”). 
96 See id. at 464–65 (majority opinion). 
97 See id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that “the thrust of the new rules is to negate all 
pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage any confession at 
all”). 
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perceived this difference, there would have been no need to move away 
from due process as the foundation for Miranda.98 
Professor Yale Kamisar—the “Father of Miranda”99—was an 
important proponent of this move to see police interrogation as generally 
risking compulsion under the privilege. In 1964, the Court had used the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to suppress confessions in two cases in 
which the defendants had counsel and, before government agents elicited 
their self-incriminating statements, either already had been indicted or had 
asked to speak to counsel.100 In a classic article published the following 
year, Kamisar argued for reinterpreting the pre-indictment case, Escobedo 
v. Illinois, as a Fifth Amendment-privilege ruling that should extend to 
uncounseled detainees.101 “His theme was that an incongruity existed in 
providing grand protections against self-incrimination at the trial . . . while 
largely nullifying those protections by allowing the police to use” 
psychological aggression “to extract incriminating statements from the 
accused at the police station . . . .”102 Although Kamisar relied in part on 
notions of equality103 to urge the right to appointed counsel for all suspects 
facing custodial interrogation,104 he also contended that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege required it.105 He argued that suspects should 
understand their rights and options before deciding to talk to the police and 
that access to counsel would serve that Fifth Amendment demand.106 In the 
end, Kamisar concluded that, as in the courtroom, where authorities cannot 
even ask the accused any questions unless he freely chooses with the aid of 
counsel to testify, the suspect in custody should enjoy substantial 
 
98 See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 84, at 547 (noting that to read Miranda as indicating that 
“compulsion” under the privilege required the kind of “coercion” needed to violate the due process test 
would not “make[] sense”). 
99 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Tribute to Yale Kamisar, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1673, 1673 (2004) (quoting 
Terry Carter, The Man Who Would Undo Miranda, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2000, at 44, 46). 
100 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205–06 (1964) (indicted suspect); Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964) (suspect asked to have counsel present for questioning). 
101 See Kamisar, supra note 21. 
102 Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: 
From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 399 (2001). 
103 See Kamisar, supra note 21, at 68–69 & 79–80. Commentators have pointed to equality as one 
of the key concerns driving Miranda. See, e.g., Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. 
REV. 1417, 1456 (1985); Howe, supra note 102, at 398; Seidman, supra note 13, at 678. 
104 See Howe, supra note 102, at 399–400. 
105 See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 21, at 9 (“Here the right to counsel converges with the privilege 
against self-incrimination . . . .”); id. at 62 (“Questions about the nature and scope of the right to 
counsel spill into questions about the nature and scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.”). 
106 See, e.g., id. at 36 (“Surely the man who, in effect, is pleading guilty in the gatehouse needs a 
lawyer no less than one who arrives at the same decision only after surviving the perilous journey 
through that structure.”). 
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protections to ensure his free choice about whether to remain silent or talk 
to the police.107 
The Miranda Court used forceful rhetoric to endorse Kamisar’s view 
of the privilege as a guarantee of free and rational choice.108 Chief Justice 
Warren, for the majority, declared that the privilege is not simply a 
protection for the custodial suspect against unusual police misconduct, but 
a substantive guarantee of “a “‘right to a private enclave where he may lead 
a private life.’”109 The privilege “require[s] the government ‘to shoulder the 
entire load’”110 and “to respect the inviolability of the human 
personality.”111 Chief Justice Warren declared that, “to permit a full 
opportunity to exercise the privilege . . . , the accused must be adequately 
and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must 
be fully honored.”112 Moreover, Chief Justice Warren seemed to endorse 
Kamisar’s view on the importance of defense counsel in respecting the 
privilege. He announced a new Fifth Amendment right to “consult with 
counsel prior to questioning” and “to have counsel present during” the 
interrogation itself,113 with indigent persons being given the right to 
appointed counsel.114 Chief Justice Warren also declared that if the accused 
makes a statement without the presence of counsel, “a heavy burden rests 
on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to 
retained or appointed counsel.”115 He concluded that “the privilege is 
fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent 
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’”116 
 
107 See id. at 14–20. 
108 The majority twice cited Kamisar’s article. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440 n.2, 472 
n.41 (1966). In addition, the majority relied on some of the principal authorities that Kamisar used in 
the article. See, e.g., id. at 469 n.38 (citing Yale Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right 
to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1962)); id. at 472 n.41 (quoting excerpts 
from the REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9 (1963)); Kamisar, supra note 21, at 7, 56 (citing Kamisar’s 1962 article); id. at 
76, 84, 89 (citing REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE). 
109 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581–82 (1956) 
(Frank, J., dissenting)). 
110 Id. (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 317 (John T. 
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 467. 
113 Id. at 470. 
114 Id. at 472–73. 
115 Id. at 475. 
116 Id. at 460 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)). 
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The creation of the Fifth Amendment right regarding counsel 
underscored the Court’s view that the privilege guaranteed both rational 
and free choice. The lawyer could educate the defendant who needs help in 
understanding his options and determining his best choice. This aspect of 
the right to counsel helped ensure that the suspect would not act self-
destructively, including the “subnormal or woefully ignorant.”117 More 
importantly in the Court’s view, for the suspect who decides to talk, the 
presence of the lawyer would reduce “the likelihood that the police will 
practice coercion,” and if coercion occurs, enable “the lawyer [to] testify to 
it in court.”118 
Based on its view that the privilege guaranteed free and rational 
choice, the Court agreed with Kamisar that, absent the famous Miranda 
warnings and the additional protections that its opinion prescribed, suspect 
statements obtained through custodial interrogation were impermissibly 
compelled.119 It is possible to misread Miranda as concerned only with 
aggressive interrogation tactics and as therefore equating compulsion under 
the privilege with coercion that would violate due process. After all, Chief 
Justice Warren asserted that “[a]n “understanding of the nature and setting 
of . . . in-custody interrogation is essential to our decisions today,”120 and he 
then spent ten pages summarizing a history of police brutality in 
interrogation along with more modern interrogation manuals that 
recommended techniques involving psychological domination and deceit.121 
That discussion might suggest that incriminating statements produced by 
milder questioning were not compelled. However, Chief Justice Warren 
explicitly rejected that view: “Even without employing brutality, the ‘third 
degree’ or the specific stratagems described above, the very fact of 
custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades 
on the weakness of individuals.”122 In fact, in both Miranda and the 
companion cases, the Court threw out confessions in which there was no 
evidence that interrogators had used tactics recommended in the manuals.123 
 
117 Id. at 468. 
118 Id. at 470 (“Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly 
overcome by the secret interrogation process.”). 
119 See id. at 467 (“We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody 
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which 
work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not 
otherwise do so freely.”). 
120 Id. at 445. 
121 Id. at 445–55. Chief Justice Warren also implied at one point that police departments across the 
country employed the techniques in the manuals on a regular basis. See id. at 449 n.9. 
122 Id. at 455. 
123 See id. at 491–93 (Miranda case); id. at 493–94 (Vignera case); id. at 494–97 (Westover case). 
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If one accepts the Miranda Court’s view of compulsion, its concern 
about custodial police questioning was justified. Putting aside momentarily 
how the practice impedes rational choice, it impedes free choice. As 
Professor Lawrence Rosenthal has noted, “implicit in custodial 
interrogation is the threat that the detention and accompanying 
interrogation will be followed by a criminal prosecution with its attendant 
sanctions.”124 That is the “kind of threat” that is “the hallmark of Fifth 
Amendment compulsion.”125 Absent extraordinary circumstances, when a 
suspect succumbs by talking, there is “no plausible way to deny” that he 
“has been compelled to respond . . . within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment by virtue of the compulsive power of custody and the inherent 
threat that it will continue unless the jailer is somehow satisfied.”126 
If the capacity for “rational” choice means that the suspect must have 
a “real understanding” of his rights, we should say for that reason as well 
that police questioning, without safeguards, infringes the privilege when 
the suspect self-incriminates. The Miranda Court looked to defense counsel 
as the person from whom a suspect could gain advice and protection.127 We 
might ask, then, what a competent criminal defense lawyer would do who, 
after committing a crime, has been arrested, and has the free choice 
whether to talk or to stand on the Fifth Amendment. Except in 
extraordinary circumstances, the lawyer would assert her rights and keep 
still,128 because the lawyer knows that talking to the police at that point can 
damage one’s defense, but it will rarely help.129 Unless we implausibly 
assume that people are generally highly self-destructive, the Miranda Court 
was correct that interrogated persons who self-incriminate were usually not 
 
124 Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 591. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 591–92. 
127 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469–70. 
128 See supra note 26 and accompanying text; infra note 213 and accompanying text. 
129 To say that waiving your Fifth Amendment right and talking to interrogation authorities without 
first seeking legal assistance would never help or never be rational is to go too far. If interrogated by a 
prosecutor, an extremely wily suspect conceivably could first negotiate a written bargain that would be 
more self-serving than the bargain that he could obtain if he had first secured the assistance of a lawyer. 
Also, a suspect who confesses contritely to the police conceivably could receive a better concession at 
plea-bargaining time and at sentencing than he would receive if he had first secured a lawyer’s 
assistance and then sincerely repented. Likewise, an arrestee could sometimes self-incriminate to save a 
friend or family member from arrest or prosecution. See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 368–
69 (2003) (suspect with two of his friends in car in which drugs were found confessed, after officer had 
said all three would face arrest if nobody admitted ownership). Yet, I believe these scenarios are outlier 
cases. For that reason, as an attorney at the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia in the 
1980s, I tried to teach my clients that upon any future arrest, they should always assert the right to 
counsel (and silence) and otherwise keep quiet. 
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acting rationally (even if freely), either because they were ill informed, 
deceived, or mentally impaired.130 
The argument that confessions are “good for the soul”131 is not a 
worthy response to the Miranda Court’s conclusion that confessions to the 
police are usually compelled. Criminal defendants generally do not confess 
to police officers in search of absolution. Police officers have no gift of 
absolution to confer, and indeed we should not conclude that persons who 
commit crimes and end up in police custody usually care about their souls 
enough to forego concern that the state can maximize their punishment if 
they self-incriminate. Undoubtedly, there are some arrestees who are not 
ignorant, mentally deficient, or mentally impaired who want to confess to 
the police to help alleviate their consciences no matter what negative 
consequences ensue, but such instances are rare.132 As Professor Donald 
Dripps asks: “[C]an this be so in thousands of cases involving people who 
have never hitherto expressed any morality different from self-interest?”133 
In the end, if we accept the Miranda Court’s view of the privilege as 
guaranteeing free and rational choice, we should also accept its conclusion: 
People subject to custodial police interrogation in a system without 
concessions generally self-incriminate not as an exercise of free will but 
because of compulsion.134 
II. THE CONVENTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE FAILURE OF 
REGULATION OF POLICE INTERROGATION 
Almost everyone who accepts the Miranda Court’s view that custodial 
police interrogation generally jeopardizes free and rational choice would 
agree that Miranda doctrine has failed to remedy that concern 
adequately.135 The basic Miranda safeguards that would supposedly solve 
 
130 See Richard H. Kuh, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants—Some Views on Miranda v. 
Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 233, 233 (1966) (contending that “there is rarely such a thing as an 
intelligent, voluntary waiver” in the police interrogation context). 
131 See Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize 
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1842 (1987) (“All suspects in custody should have a nonwaivable 
right to consult with a lawyer before being interrogated by the police.”). 
132 For the view of a former prosecutor that such cases are rare, see Kuh, supra note 130, at 233. 
133 Dripps, supra note 4, at 704–05. 
134 See Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 591 (“But when a public official, with a badge and a gun, 
deprives a suspect of his liberty, places him in custody, and then asks, ‘do you have anything to say?’ is 
it really the case that there is no compulsion to respond?”); Stuntz, supra note 1, at 978 (contending that 
suspects will rarely make such an admission if they are “rational, informed, [and] unpressured”). 
135 See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 131, at 1842–45; Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, 
A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 109–11 (1989); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 880–82 (1981); Sandra 
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the problem include the famous four-part warnings that police must provide 
to the custodial suspect before interrogation,136 the requirement that the 
suspect knowingly and intelligently waive the rights to silence and to 
counsel,137 and rules about how police must honor an assertion by a suspect 
of either of those rights.138 Those safeguards were supposed to substantially 
reduce suspect self-incrimination,139 and the remedy for violations was 
supposed to be suppression, which was also supposed to happen 
frequently.140 After all, the Miranda majority claimed that the goal was not 
to achieve mere technical compliance with the Fifth Amendment by 
providing a warning that would allow an easily secured waiver as “a 
preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.”141 Nonetheless, the 
prevailing consensus that the doctrine has failed rests on evidence that the 
vast majority of custodial suspects—roughly eighty percent142—still agree 
to talk when interrogated143 and that courts rarely suppress any evidence 
under Miranda.144 Conventional proposals to solve this failure focus on 
increasing the prevention and suppression numbers.145 In this Part, I briefly 
reprise these critiques and the proposed solutions. 
 
Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Failed to “Save” Miranda, 40 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 645, 645 (2006). 
136 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any questioning, the person must 
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence 
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”). 
137 See id. at 475 (“If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a 
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly 
and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed 
counsel.”). 
138 See id. at 473–74 (declaring that “[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior 
to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease,” and that “[i]f the 
individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present”). 
139 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 1, at 995 (asserting that Miranda requires “inviting suspects not to 
talk”). 
140 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (“But unless and until such warnings and waiver are 
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used 
against him.”). 
141 See id. at 476. 
142 See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 
387, 495–96 (1996); Leo, supra note 1, at 302. 
143 The percentage that refuse to talk may approximate the percentage that refused to talk in the 
pre-Miranda era. See Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. 
REV. 551, 557 (2007) (“Possibly as many as twenty percent of suspects in the pre-Miranda era invoked 
silence.”); Leo, supra note 1, at 302. 
144 See, e.g., Duke, supra note 143, at 568 (contending that today “virtually all confessions will be 
admissible in evidence”). 
145 See infra Section II.B. 
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A. Mainstream Critiques of Miranda 
The prevailing, anticonfessional perspective on Miranda’s failure146 
assumes that the best way to honor the privilege as it applies to police 
interrogation is to reduce suspect admissions and suppress evidence related 
to them.147 Miranda doctrine does little to accomplish those goals. From the 
conventional perspective, there are two parts to the explanation. Perhaps 
the most popular is that the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts largely 
destroyed the effectiveness of the original Miranda safeguards.148 The 
other, more salient, is that the original Miranda safeguards were largely 
ineffective except in creating essentially what the Miranda Court said it 
aimed to avoid149—“a preliminary ritual to existing methods of 
interrogation.”150 In this Section, I summarize each of those conventional 
critiques. 
1. Claims of Subsequent Destruction of Miranda                
Doctrine.—Protestations that the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts 
Courts largely eviscerated Miranda are accurate and play a major role in 
the conventional, anticonfessional narrative about its failure.151 Indeed, for 
law-and-order conservatives, Miranda was a symbol of the Supreme Court 
 
146 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 1, at 978 (asserting that the definition of the problem—and, thus, 
the solution, “is this: Police interrogation is bad; hence any body of law that permits much police 
interrogation is bad . . . .”). 
147 See Dripps, supra note 4, at 700–01 (“We must . . . choose between honoring the suspect’s 
autonomy and forgoing the acquisition of significant and otherwise unobtainable evidence of crime.”). 
148 See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. 
Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 24 (2010) (“As numerous commentators have observed, Miranda has 
effectively been overruled.”); KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 84, at 551 (noting that a variety of post-
Miranda cases from the Supreme Court that limit Miranda’s reach “have led various commentators” to 
say that Miranda is now of little value); see also Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of 
Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965, 980–1021 (2012) [hereinafter Kamisar, Rise, Decline, and Fall] 
(discussing the many ways in which the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts limited and undermined 
the original Miranda holdings); Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why 
We Needed It, How We Got It—And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 163, 178–84 
(2007) [hereinafter Kamisar, Fortieth Anniversary] (focusing on the “Weakening of the ‘Original 
Miranda’” as the reason for Miranda’s minor impact on law enforcement and its failure to eliminate the 
coerciveness of police interrogation); Leo & Koenig, supra note 18, at 329 (“Subsequent decisions of 
the Court—Miranda’s progeny—have, in effect killed the version of Miranda that the Warren Court . . . 
had laid out.”); Ogletree, supra note 131, at 1839 (“After two decades of Supreme Court tinkering, the 
situations in which the Miranda exclusionary rule applies are now extremely limited.”). 
149 See, e.g., Leo & Koenig, supra note 18, at 336 (asserting that the “original Miranda was 
destined to fail on its own terms” because it “fail[s] to dispel interrogation compulsion prior to the 
warning and waiver ritual” and “also fails to dispel compulsion afterwards”); Seidman, supra note 13, 
at 744 (describing Miranda as “a retreat from the promise of liberal individualism brilliantly 
camouflaged under the cover of bold advance”). 
150 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). 
151 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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gone awry,152 and, soon after the Warren era ended, the more conservative 
majorities on the Court began limiting or gutting Miranda’s various 
holdings. The Burger Court started by ruling that the government can 
introduce a criminal defendant’s statement obtained in violation of 
Miranda to impeach his testimony at trial.153 Likewise, the Burger Court 
rejected the implication in Miranda154 that the doctrine applied to anyone 
who was the “focus” of a police investigation, ultimately holding that 
Miranda doctrine covers only those who already have been formally 
arrested or restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest.155 The Court 
also limited the definition of “interrogation,” such that Miranda would not 
apply to many provocative actions by police that cause suspects to self-
incriminate, such as discussion between two officers transporting a suspect 
in custody about the dangers to children at a school for the handicapped 
from a shotgun that he had hidden nearby.156 Criticism from the 
conventional perspective on Miranda’s failure also has focused heavily on 
 
152 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
153 See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1975) (failure to cease questioning after assertion of 
rights); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (failure to provide warnings). This limitation 
coincided with the Court’s rulings on impeachment under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United 
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627–28 (1980) (allowing impeachment of defendant’s statements made 
during proper cross-examination with evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Walder 
v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 66 (1954) (holding that state could impeach defendant charged with drug 
distribution with evidence illegally seized from his home after he took the stand and asserted on direct 
examination that he had never possessed, sold, or distributed narcotics). 
154 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 n.4 (asserting that, regarding the meaning of an interrogation that 
was “custodial,” “[t]his is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had 
focused on an accused”). 
155 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437–42 (1984) (9–0 decision) (holding that roadside 
questioning of motorist detained on suspicion of drunk driving was not custodial interrogation for 
purposes of Miranda); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (holding that Miranda did 
not apply to interview by federal agents of Beckwith in private home although he was the focus of a 
federal criminal investigation). In California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983), the Court declared that a 
person is “in custody” for Miranda purposes, if “there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 
movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id. at 1125 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 
429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). More recently, the Roberts Court held that “lawful imprisonment imposed 
upon conviction of a crime” does not itself constitute custody for Miranda purposes. Maryland v. 
Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113 (2010). This ruling effectively overturned a post-Miranda decision of the 
Warren Court. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1968) (holding that a person serving a 
prison sentence was in custody for Miranda purposes). 
156 These facts are from Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 294–95 (1980). There, the Court ruled 
that “interrogation” was “express questioning” or “words or actions on the part of the police (other than 
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response.” Id. at 301. The effect was that a provocative statement by one police 
officer to another in front of the suspect was deemed not to constitute “interrogation.” See id. at 294–95, 
302–03. Because even an express question is not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, 
commentators criticized the Innis test. See, e.g., Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without Questions: 
Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209, 1227–36 (1980). 
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the post-Warren Court’s restriction of fruits suppression for violations. In 
1974, the Court ruled that the government could use at trial a witness 
discovered through a Miranda violation.157 The Court grounded this 
holding on the notion that Miranda only articulated “prophylactic rules” 
rather than true constitutional rules158 and that compulsion under the Fifth 
Amendment equates with coercion under the due process “voluntariness” 
test.159 Because a Miranda violation purportedly did not involve a true 
constitutional violation, the Court could properly create exceptions to the 
normal rules on fruits suppression.160 This reasoning amounted to “an 
outright rejection of the core premises of Miranda.”161 The Court later used 
the same reasoning to allow as evidence against a defendant a statement to 
the police, elicited after Miranda warnings, that was the fruit of a prior 
statement that was obtained in violation of Miranda.162 While the Court 
subsequently declined to use the same rationale to overrule Miranda 
altogether,163 it continued to restrict the fruits doctrine that applies in 
Miranda cases.164 Most recently, in 2004, the Court ruled that the 
prosecution may introduce physical evidence discovered through a 
Miranda violation.165 
 
157 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 449–50 (1974) (unwarned statement leading to witness). 
158 For a refutation of this view of Miranda, see Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 586–603. 
159 See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 84, at 547. 
160 See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444–46. 
161 Stone, supra note 94, at 118. 
162 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305–08 (1985). 
163 In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000), the Court upheld Miranda against a 
claim that it had gone beyond what the Constitution requires and that Congress had properly overruled 
it. Rather surprisingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court. See MCCLOSKEY, supra 
note 92, at 168. The seven-Justice majority also included Justice O’Connor. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 
430. Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor previously had been among those on the Court who had 
viewed Miranda doctrine negatively, declaring it nonconstitutional prophylaxis. See, e.g., Elstad, 
470 U.S. at 300, 309. Two other Justices who had taken this position, Scalia and Thomas, dissented in 
Dickerson, contending that the Court should overrule Miranda. See 530 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
164 In Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the Court limited Elstad modestly, retaining a very 
restrictive fruits doctrine for Miranda cases. In Seibert, a police officer deliberately avoided providing 
warnings before custodial interrogation and, once the suspect incriminated herself, gave the warnings 
and confronted the suspect with the inadmissible prewarning statements, pressuring her to acknowledge 
them. See id. at 620–21 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). In the decisive opinion for the Court, 
Justice Kennedy concluded that a postwarning statement obtained through this particular two-stage 
approach was inadmissible unless the officer employed “curative measures” before the suspect made 
the post-warning statements. Id. at 622. However, Justice Kennedy concluded that “a substantial break 
in time and circumstances between the prewarning statement and the Miranda warning may suffice in 
most circumstances.” Id. Alternatively, he concluded that “an additional warning that explains the likely 
inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement may be sufficient.” Id. 
165 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644–45 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Wisconsin v. Knapp, 542 U.S. 952 (2004). 
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The post-Warren Court also has taken other measures that contribute 
to what Professor Barry Friedman calls the “stealth overruling” of 
Miranda.166 For example, the Court said that police and courts can ignore 
Miranda when justified by considerations of public safety.167 The Court 
also began recognizing implicit waivers of rights,168 rejecting the Miranda 
Court’s strong suggestion that such waivers must be explicit.169 Regarding 
assertions, the Court also began demanding that any assertion of rights be 
clear and unambiguous,170 contrary to the suspect-oriented approach 
endorsed by the Miranda opinion.171 Most importantly, the Court recently 
concluded, contrary to language in Miranda,172 that police officers need not 
secure a waiver before commencing with interrogation and that police and 
courts can presume a waiver when the suspect, after receiving warnings 
and where there is no evidence that he did not understand them, eventually 
responds to a question.173 
Anticonfessional fans of Miranda have taken some minor consolation 
from the half-hearted protections that post-Warren majorities on the Court 
have afforded the suspect who unambiguously invokes the Fifth 
Amendment.174 The police must “scrupulously honor[]” the invocation, but 
this may only require that the police suspend interrogation for two hours 
and repeat the Miranda warnings before recommencing.175 However, if the 
 
166 See Friedman, supra note 148, at 1. 
167 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 651 (1984). 
168 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 US. 369, 375–76 (1979). 
169 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (declaring that “[a]n express statement that 
the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a 
statement could constitute a waiver” but that “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the 
silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact 
eventually obtained”). 
170 See, e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2181 (2013) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
assertion of the right to silence requires “express invocation”); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 
459 (1994) (holding that an assertion of the right to counsel must be clear and unambiguous). 
171 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74 (“If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior 
to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.”). 
172 See id. at 475. 
173 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 385–87 (2010). For the view that Thompkins “goes a 
long way towards undoing Miranda,” see Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Love-Hate Relationship 
with Miranda, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375, 381 (2011). 
174 See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104–05 (1975) (approving of re-interrogation of 
suspect who had invoked the right to silence on an earlier interrogation attempt concerning an unrelated 
crime). 
175 Id. at 104. In Mosley, when the suspect unambiguously asserted his right to remain silent, the 
detective ceased the interrogation. Id. More than two hours later, a different officer brought Mosley to a 
different location and reread the rights, which Mosley then waived. Id. He subsequently self-
incriminated regarding a hold-up murder unrelated to the crime about which the initial detective 
intended to question him. Id. at 98. The uncertainty about Mosley is whether the fact that the second 
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suspect invokes the right to counsel, the Court has concluded that a more 
protective, prophylactic rule will apply: No waiver is possible unless the 
suspect unilaterally reinitiates communication with the police concerning 
the investigation.176 This bright-line safeguard applies until fourteen days 
have passed since the suspect is released from presentencing custody.177 
These protections can help the suspect who asserts the right to counsel, if 
the assertion causes the police to cease interrogation. Some suspects may 
then avoid self-incrimination that otherwise would have occurred. At the 
same time, if the suspect ends up incriminating himself because the police 
flout the rules, the limitations on fruits suppression will render the 
protections largely meaningless.178 
2. Claims About Miranda’s Original Flaws.—Despite the popularity 
of claims that post-Warren majorities on the Court have eviscerated 
Miranda, much commentary has correctly noted that the original opinion 
provided little protection for suspects. There were two main problems. The 
first was the deficient and erroneous advice provided by the warnings 
themselves.179 The second was the absence of clear limitations180 on tactics 
that the police could use before and after reading the warnings to secure a 
waiver and on tactics they could use after obtaining a waiver to elicit 
 
interrogation was by a different officer and concerned a different crime mattered to the Court’s 
conclusion that Mosley’s rights were scrupulously honored. Those facts would not seem important 
given that Mosley did not know what the police intended to discuss with him at either stage and that the 
Court has held that the police need not inform the suspect of the subject matter to be discussed before 
securing a valid waiver. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987). For more on the meaning of 
Mosley, see KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 84, at 596–97. 
176 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). 
177 See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010). 
178 See supra text accompanying notes 157–165; see also Leo & Koenig, supra note 18, at 335–36 
(noting that Miranda protects only in the rare case where the suspect invokes one or the other rights and 
police honor the decision). 
179 See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law 
and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 793 (2006) (proposing that the warning should include 
“something to the effect of: ‘If you choose to remain silent . . . your silence will not be used against you 
as evidence to suggest that you committed a crime simply because you refused to speak’”); id. at 806–
07 (proposing that the warning also state “If you choose to talk, you may change your mind and remain 
silent at any time, even if you have already spoken”); Stuntz, supra note 1, at 993 (noting that the 
warnings leave out much information that would be helpful to suspects, such as that “their silence will 
not be used against them”). 
180 The Miranda Court at one point articulated a proscription against overly aggressive police 
behavior designed to secure a waiver, but the Court’s admonition raised the same kind of subjectivity 
problem as the old due process test: “Moreover, any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, 
or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.” 
384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). 
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statements.181 Due mostly to these aspects of the original doctrine, almost 
all suspects, despite receiving the warnings, still waive their rights and talk 
to the police.182 What Miranda added, therefore, was not helpful protections 
for the defendant as much as “a mechanism by which the defendant could 
give up” any claim to protections and then self-incriminate.183 
The mandated warnings are themselves problematic.184 They are at 
best unhelpful to the suspect. They fail to tell him that his silence or 
invocation of rights cannot be used against him at trial and that he retains 
the option to invoke his rights after having waived them.185 Also, one part 
of the mandated warnings is materially misleading. The second sentence 
advises that “anything [you] say[] can [and will] be used against [you] in a 
court of law.”186 This is not true, because an express invocation of the right 
to silence or to counsel cannot be used against the suspect.187 The result of 
the omissions and the erroneous information is that not even the most 
astute person hearing the warnings could determine what his relevant rights 
actually are and certainly not the course of action that would best protect 
his legal interests,188 which is to assert the right to counsel and otherwise 
remain silent.189 
 
181 See, e.g., Kamisar, Fortieth Anniversary, supra note 148, at 187 (noting that what the police 
may do after a “suspect effectively waives his rights, . . . amazingly, . . . is still unclear”). 
182 See supra text accompanying note 143. Evidence of the failure of Miranda to prevent waivers 
and self-incrimination started to accumulate immediately after the decision. See, e.g., Michael Wald et 
al., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1563 (1967) (based on an 
eleven-week study of police interrogations in New Haven, Connecticut, in the summer of 1966, 
researchers concluded that there was “[n]o support . . . for the claim that warnings reduce the amount of 
‘talking’”). 
183 Seidman, supra note 13, at 744. 
184 In Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), the Court re-endorsed the Miranda warning and 
waiver procedure, holding that it generally suffices to establish a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel during interrogation when the Sixth Amendment right applies. See id. at 296. The Court 
noted that “we have permitted a Miranda waiver to stand where a suspect was not told that his lawyer 
was trying to reach him during questioning; in the Sixth Amendment context, this waiver would not be 
valid.” Id. at 296 n.9. The Court also left open whether a suspect who has been indicted must be told of 
that fact to effectuate a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right, because Patterson was so advised. 
See id. at 295 n.8. 
185 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
186 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
187 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
188 The facts in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), are instructive. There, the defendant, 
after being given the Miranda warnings, remained largely silent despite continued interrogation for 
approximately two hours and forty-five minutes. Id. at 379. Finally, in response to a question about 
whether he prayed to God for forgiveness for shooting one of the victims, he self-incriminated by 
answering affirmatively. Id. at 376. The Supreme Court concluded that because there was no evidence 
that he did not understand the warnings, he could be presumed to have knowingly and intelligently 
waived his Fifth Amendment rights when he responded. Id. at 385. But, if he understood his rights, why 
wouldn’t he have asserted them? His failure to respond to questioning for such a long period might at 
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The warnings are affirmatively harmful to the suspect who carefully 
considers them. They actually steer him toward self-incrimination. The 
second warning indicates that asserting either the right to silence or to 
counsel would be incriminating. Should the suspect then just remain silent? 
The warnings do not clarify whether this would incriminate him, but a 
failure to respond seems incriminating.190 Should he waive and give a false 
story of innocence? Should he waive and confess? These latter two options 
sound the best. Maybe he can fool the police. Or maybe there would be 
some hope for leniency if he were to confess. If we want to understand the 
reasons that the vast majority of Mirandized subjects mysteriously waive 
their rights and talk to the police against their self-interest, we should start 
with the unhelpful, even harmful, content of the warnings. 
Miranda also failed to adequately prevent the police from using many 
kinds of exploitative tactics to help induce a waiver even before providing 
the warnings. For example, the police could tell a suspect that he is not 
under arrest to avoid giving him any warnings until they have questioned 
him to the point of self-incrimination.191 They could frame the warnings “as 
an irrelevant bureaucratic procedure” so that suspects would “not 
recogniz[e] the import of their actions.”192 They could “suggest to suspects 
that providing information to police could lead to the suspect’s case being 
viewed more favorably” or “imply that a suspect’s relationship with police 
 
least cause us to doubt that he understood and to look for an explanation. Instead, the Court assumed 
that the defendant was simply foolish, which presumably is its view of the many suspects who, when 
read the warnings, waive them. I submit that the starting point for a more plausible explanation is to 
recognize that the Miranda warnings on their face are too opaque—even inaccurate—to be understood 
in the sense required to support a knowing and intelligent waiver. 
189 See supra text accompanying notes 176–178. On the question of whether suspects should 
confess contritely and hope for a concession, the experience of Jesse Montejo warrants consideration. 
See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009). Despite a full confession to murder, cooperation in 
locating the weapon, and a letter of apology to the victim’s widow that he wrote during the excursion, 
id. at 781–82, the prosecution used his apology letter to help convict him for capital murder and to send 
him to death row. Id. This scenario exemplifies, in my view, that a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights 
and confession to the police is almost always a bad decision under current law. For more on the 
implications of Montejo for this Article’s proposal, see infra text accompanying notes 330–332. 
190 The decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), bears on this question. There, the Court 
concluded that due process prevents the government from impeaching a defendant with his silence in 
the wake of Miranda warnings. In support, the majority asserted: “[W]hile it is true that the Miranda 
warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to 
any person who receives the warnings.” Id. at 618. Yet, in dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices 
Blackmun and Rehnquist, concluded that the warnings contained no such implicit message so that the 
no-impeachment rule was unnecessary to prevent the warnings from being “deceptive.” See id. at 621 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
191 See Leo & Koenig, supra note 18, at 331. 
192 Id. 
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is nonadversarial.”193 They could imply that “the police are neutral fact 
finders who can help him and that opening up to these powerful friends is 
the only way to improve his situation.”194 
Miranda also allows the police, after securing a waiver, to use at least 
as much deceit and pressure as they could have employed under the old due 
process “voluntariness” test. A waiver is in effect a grant of permission by 
the suspect for the police to use compulsion to elicit a confession. All of the 
tactics recommended by the interrogation manuals to psychologically 
dominate and deceive the suspect—the very tactics criticized by the 
Miranda Court195—become fair game after a waiver.196 Because few 
suspects, having waived their rights and begun to talk, subsequently change 
their minds,197 the interrogation tactics used before Miranda continue to 
flourish.198 As one commentator has noted: 
A common strategy is to tell the suspect that the purpose of the interrogation 
is not to debate whether he committed the crime, but why: “Well, let me tell 
you something, okay? I didn’t bring you down here to ask you if you did it. 
Okay? I brought you down here to tell me why you did it.”199 
Today, as before, interrogation is often “a strategic, multistage, goal-
directed, stress-driven exercise in persuasion and deception, one designed 
to produce a very specific set of psychological effects and reactions in 
order to move the suspect from denial to admission.”200 Many 
commentators even believe that judges now sometimes permit levels of 
police aggression that courts would have found to violate due process in the 
pre-Miranda era.201 When the suspect has effectively consented by waiving 
in accordance with Miranda doctrine, judges rarely conclude that 
subsequent statements are involuntary.202 
 
193 Id. at 331–32; see also Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 598 (“To be sure, many interrogators are 
adept at using some combination of threats and inducements to convince suspects to submit to 
interrogation—and even to confess—regardless of whether it was in the suspect’s interest to do so.”). 
194 Leo & Koenig, supra note 18, at 332. 
195 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
196 See Guerra Thompson, supra note 135, at 652–53. 
197 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 1, at 988. 
198 For a summary of the kinds of psychological tactics that post-Miranda police interrogators have 
legitimately employed, see LEO, supra note 2, at 119–64. 
199 Id. at 135. 
200 Id. at 119. 
201 See, e.g., Duke, supra note 143, at 562–63; Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of 
Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1027 (2001); Seidman, supra note 13, at 
745–46; Weisselberg, supra note 38, at 1595; Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain 
Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1220 (2001). 
202 See Duke, supra note 143, at 562. 
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B. Conventional Reform Proposals 
Orthodox proposals to solve Miranda’s failure,203 like the conventional 
accounts of the failure itself, are intended as anticonfessional. They urge 
reforms that purportedly would prevent and suppress more suspect 
admissions. The proposals include modifying existing Miranda rules to 
make them more defense oriented, electronic recording of interrogation 
sessions, requiring a defense lawyer’s assistance to suspects prior to and 
during police questioning, interrogation by judges instead of by police 
officers, or a return to an invigorated due process test of “voluntariness” 
alone. All of these proposals assume that to honor the privilege we must do 
better at preventing or excluding admissions by custodial suspects. 
1. Adjustments to Miranda Doctrine.—Scholarly proposals to fine-
tune Miranda doctrine to help suspects avoid making admissions or to 
exclude evidence related to the ones they do make have long been 
prevalent. Commentators have often denounced the changes by the post-
Warren majorities, contending that the protections that Miranda originally 
imposed would have better accomplished those goals. For example, 
scholars have urged that post-Warren majorities should not have 
eviscerated the fruits doctrine for Miranda violations,204 should not have 
abandoned the presumption against waivers of Miranda rights,205 and 
should not have required that suspects assert their rights unambiguously.206 
Other commentators who note the ineffectiveness of the original doctrine 
point to different adjustments. They contend, for example, that the Court 
should have made the warnings better for suspects so that they would 
understand the relative dangers of talking to the police207 and should have 
 
203 Some who accept that custodial police interrogation always risks producing a “compelled” 
statement may nonetheless conclude that the original Miranda doctrine was not a failure. See, e.g., 
Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 606. If one finds that the original Miranda opinion provided an adequate 
warning-and-waiver procedure, then Miranda itself secured compliance with the Fifth Amendment. See 
id. However, even on that view, one can conclude that much of the evisceration of Miranda doctrine by 
post-Warren-era majorities has been unjustified. 
204 See, e.g., Guerra Thompson, supra note 135, at 648–50; Kamisar, Fortieth Anniversary, supra 
note 148, at 202. 
205 See, e.g., Leo & Koenig, supra note 18, at 333. 
206 See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1011, 
1062–63 (2007); Weisselberg, supra note 38, at 1588–89; see also Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different 
Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 320 (1993) 
(arguing against the unambiguous-assertion standard before the Supreme Court adopted it based on its 
discriminatory effect against women and certain minority groups). 
207 See, e.g., Godsey, supra note 179, at 784 (noting that “one of the leading reasons why Miranda 
has not had its anticipated effect—why most suspects feel compulsion and waive their Miranda 
rights—is because suspects are not informed” that exercise of their right to silence cannot be used 
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articulated and enforced clearer protections to prevent the police from 
“talking the suspect out of asserting his rights before the ‘waiver of rights’ 
transaction ever takes place.”208 From the conventional, anticonfessional 
perspective, these kinds of reforms would better honor the privilege by 
ensuring that fewer suspects self-incriminate or that the government would 
face more obstacles to using their admissions against them. 
2. Assistance by a Defense Lawyer.—Some scholars have urged that 
the best way for the Court to honor the privilege in the interrogation 
context is to require that the custodial suspect have a nonwaivable right to 
counsel as a precondition to any waiver of Fifth Amendment rights.209 As a 
corollary, they have proposed that the government could not use against the 
suspect at trial any evidence obtained through a violation of this rule.210 
Professor Charles Ogletree has urged this approach, among other reasons, 
because of the failure of Miranda doctrine to adequately inform the 
custodial suspect of the relative benefits of speaking with the police versus 
invoking the Fifth Amendment and remaining silent.211 He has urged that 
appointment of counsel would help ensure that the suspect understands his 
rights and also reigns in the likelihood of “police abuse and trickery.”212 
Commentators agree that imposing such a regime would greatly reduce the 
number of admissions that police would elicit from custodial suspects.213 
3. Interrogation by Magistrates.—Some commentators have argued 
that the Court should have required interrogation by judicial officers—or, 
at least, supervision by judicial officers—instead of imposing Miranda 
doctrine.214 The basic idea is that the government could not use a suspect’s 
 
against them at trial); Stuntz, supra note 1, at 993 (contending that persons who know that “their silence 
will not be used against them” are more likely to invoke their Miranda rights (emphasis omitted)). 
208 Kamisar, Fortieth Anniversary, supra note 148, at 187 (emphasis omitted). Professor Kamisar 
concludes that the Miranda Court did prohibit such cajoling, at least in general terms, but that courts 
have not adequately enforced the prohibition. See id.; see also supra note 186 (quoting the Miranda 
Court’s prohibition). 
209 See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 131, at 1830; see also Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court 
and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449, 497 (1964) (“[I]nsistence upon the 
presence of counsel in all cases is simply an insistence upon the barrier to confession imposed by an 
effective privilege against self-incrimination . . . .”). 
210 See Ogletree, supra note 131, at 1830. 
211 See id. at 1827. 
212 See id. at 1845. 
213 See, e.g., Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 375, 384 (1997); 
Kamisar, supra note 21, at 36–38; Seidman, supra note 13, at 741; cf. Caplan, supra note 103, at 1441 
(opposing the notion that custodial suspects should have the right to consult with counsel before and 
during interrogation because “there may be fewer confessions and more crime”). 
214 See Kamisar, Rise, Decline, and Fall, supra note 148, at 1032–38 (discussing the history of this 
proposal without endorsing it). 
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admission unless the suspect made it to a judge or magistrate, and that 
those officials would avoid some of the more aggressive interrogation 
tactics employed by police officers.215 Under current law,216 a suspect 
appearing before a state judicial officer would likely have the right to the 
assistance of a lawyer217 and the right to warnings that any statement made 
could be used against him.218 Also, the refusal of the suspect to answer 
questions before a judicial officer could not serve as the basis for an 
inference of guilt by the factfinder at trial.219 Given those protections, 
employing a judicial-interrogation approach as an alternative to Miranda 
today would greatly reduce the number of suspect admissions available to 
the prosecution for use at trial. In this sense, the approach would better 
honor the Fifth Amendment privilege than Miranda doctrine. 
4. Return to an Invigorated Due Process Standard.—Some scholars 
have urged that the Court would advance the goal of honoring the Fifth 
Amendment privilege by abandoning Miranda doctrine and returning to a 
revitalized version of the due process “voluntariness” standard.220 This 
position builds on the notion that Miranda reduced rather than increased 
the protections that custodial suspects realize during the interrogation 
process.221 By eliminating the effective consent that an easily secured 
Miranda waiver provides to the police to use compulsion,222 these scholars 
hope that courts would scrutinize police interrogation tactics more carefully 
to determine whether they constitute coercion as a matter of due process.223 
Other scholars have noted that Miranda warnings are so helpful to the 
police that many would use them even if the Court did not require them.224 
This point suggests that the Court would actually have to declare Miranda 
warnings unconstitutional to stop all police departments from using them, 
which seems particularly unlikely. In any event, if the police would stop 
 
215 See id. at 1033 (describing the judicial officer as “presumably more neutral” than a police 
officer). 
216 Proposals for judicial interrogation initially preceded Miranda and rulings by the Court on the 
right of noncapital criminal defendants in state court to counsel. See id. at 1032 (noting that Professor 
Paul Kauper first proposed this approach as an alternative to police interrogation in 1932). 
217 See id. at 1034. 
218 See id. 
219 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
220 See, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 461, 496–502 (1998); Stuntz, supra note 1, at 995–96; Weisselberg, supra note 38, at 
1595–96. 
221 See Seidman, supra note 13, at 745–46; Weisselberg, supra note 38, at 1595. 
222 See supra text accompanying notes 195–202. 
223 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 999; Weisselberg, supra note 38, at 1596. 
224 See, e.g., Duke, supra note 143, at 566. 
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following the Miranda regime, the notion is that courts would actually 
suppress more suspect admissions and better honor the Constitution. 
III. A PRO-CONFESSIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE FAILURE OF 
REGULATION OF POLICE INTERROGATION 
In this Part, I contend that we best understand the failure of efforts to 
regulate police interrogation under the Fifth Amendment from a pro-
confessional perspective—one that favors rather than disfavors suspect 
self-incrimination. I accept the Miranda Court’s view that the privilege 
protects free and rational choice by suspects and that unregulated police 
interrogation that elicits a self-incriminating statement, without any reward 
to the suspect, almost always denies it.225 But I also am pleased that 
Miranda doctrine does not prevent or exclude most suspect admissions to 
the police. 
From this perspective, I still urge Miranda doctrine as a failure. This 
position builds on the view that honoring the privilege need not be 
anticonfessional—that there are ways to incentivize suspects to self-
incriminate and also to ameliorate police compulsion. Moreover, this 
position builds on the view that honoring the privilege must not be 
anticonfessional if is to succeed in equitable fashion. Any effort to impose 
doctrine that will prevent or suppress all or most custodial suspect 
admissions will too greatly hamper law enforcement to find general 
acceptance.226 Many observers believe that the Miranda Court itself 
recognized this point when it did not impose rules that would prevent or 
exclude more custodial suspect admissions.227 Yet, any effort to articulate 
doctrine that aims to prevent or suppress only a few of those admissions 
will both appear arbitrary and fail to honor the privilege. Such an effort 
may also perversely incentivize those who know the rules. This latter 
situation describes the true failure of Miranda doctrine. In the end, the 
explanation for its malfunction is not that it hasn’t done enough to deter 
and suppress suspect admissions, but that it focuses on deterrence and 
suppression in the first instance. 
 
225 See supra Section I.B. 
226 For the classic statement of the need for suspect admissions to the police in solving many 
criminal cases, see Fred E. Inbau, Police Interrogation—A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 16, 16–17 (1961). 
227 See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986) (asserting that the Miranda decision was 
a compromise designed to strike a “balance between society’s legitimate law enforcement interests and 
the protection of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights”). 
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A. A Pro-Confessional Critique of Miranda Doctrine 
Miranda was a bad compromise from the start because it did little to 
honor the Fifth Amendment privilege and, worse, encouraged bad conduct 
by custodial suspects, the police, and the courts. In this area, we should 
hope for law that encourages suspects to self-incriminate based on free and 
rational choice, ameliorates police compulsion, and enables courts to speak 
honestly about the application of the rules to the interrogation process. 
Miranda managed to accomplish none of those goals and, in important 
respects, to subvert all of them. In light of the perverse incentives that it 
created, I submit that the original doctrine warranted evisceration by post-
Warren majorities on the Court. I do not contend that the Court’s current 
approach to regulating police interrogation is optimal. The remnants of 
Miranda that we have today are no better than the original doctrine in terms 
of both honoring the privilege and incentivizing desirable behavior. 
However, the original Miranda doctrine was so bad by those measures that 
it is hard to describe what we have today as worse. 
1. The Miranda Opinion and Perverse Incentives.—While orthodox 
critiques of the original Miranda opinion reveal its failure to adequately 
honor the Fifth Amendment privilege,228 they typically do not underscore 
the wrongheaded incentives that it created. Miranda generally rewarded the 
most cunning suspects, who are the most likely to assert their rights and 
otherwise remain silent.229 It invited well-trained police officers to exploit 
vulnerable arrestees and to treat the law as a pretense.230 And it called on 
lower courts to speak dishonestly about suspect waivers and the 
interrogation process.231 A legal system that aims to honor and promote 
honesty, human dignity, and governmental legitimacy should not 
encourage those behaviors. 
Miranda doctrine was from the start unhelpful to the vast majority of 
arrestees,232 but, oddly, it did reward a small group of the most guileful 
suspects—often recidivists—for obstructionist behavior.233 Part of the 
 
228 See supra Section II.A.2. 
229 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 977 (“The winners in this regulatory game are likely to be the savvy 
suspects,” and they are “likely to be defined by either wealth or experience — meaning experience 
dealing with the system, something that recidivists naturally possess.”). 
230 See, e.g., LEO, supra note 2, at 128 (noting that “the strategies that American interrogators use 
to obtain signed waivers have, in effect, turned Miranda on its head”). 
231 See infra text accompanying notes 267–276. 
232 See Section II.A.2. 
233 In one of the most important empirical studies of police interrogation, Richard Leo concluded 
that “[t]he more experience a suspect has with the criminal justice system, the more likely he is to take 
advantage of his Miranda rights to terminate questioning and seek counsel.” Leo, supra note 1, at 286. 
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reason was the opaque, four-part warnings that Miranda mandated.234 They 
would befuddle not only persons of low intelligence or impaired mental 
abilities but even the most high-functioning individuals. They provide little, 
if any, useful guidance about how to deal with police interrogators.235 
Indeed, they mislead about how to serve one’s interests.236 Consequently, 
both waivers and assertions of Fifth Amendment rights by suspects who 
receive the warnings are generally only random acts among the confused. 
The exception is assertions of these rights by suspects who already 
know of Miranda’s substantive protections for those who assert their 
rights.237 Those suspects act rationally by asserting. Thus, the primary 
beneficiaries of Miranda are an indiscriminate lucky few who randomly 
assert their rights and a substantial group of persons schooled in Fifth 
Amendment law—mostly hardened criminals.238 Do we want interrogation 
law to help only these individuals but not the first-time arrestees who are 
least informed about their rights and the most easily coerced by the 
police?239 
The original Miranda doctrine also encouraged police officers to act at 
least as deceitfully and aggressively as when they were governed by the 
due process “voluntariness” test alone. As we have seen, once having 
obtained a Miranda waiver, officers have always been free to use the very 
same exploitative tactics that they used in the pre-Miranda era.240 After 
Miranda, as before, “[p]olice elicit the decision to confess from the guilty 
by leading them to believe that the evidence against them is overwhelming, 
that their fate is certain (whether or not they confess), and that there are 
advantages that follow if they confess.”241 Of course, this is generally 
 
Other prior empirical studies had reached the same conclusions. See, e.g., David W. Neubauer, 
Confessions in Prairie City: Some Causes and Effects, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 106–07 
(1974); Wald et al., supra note 182, at 1562–77. 
234 For the warnings, see supra note 9. 
235 See supra notes 184–190. 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 189–191. 
237 For a discussion of the “second-level” Miranda protections that apply when a suspect invokes 
the right to silence or to counsel, see supra text accompanying notes 174–178. 
238 See Leo, supra note 1, at 286 (concluding from empirical study that “a suspect with a felony 
record . . . was almost four times as likely to invoke his Miranda rights as a suspect with no prior record 
and almost three times as likely to invoke as a suspect with a misdemeanor record”); Stuntz, supra note 
1, at 977 (noting that “recidivists naturally possess” the “experience dealing with the system” to best 
understand “their situation”). 
239 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 994 (criticizing Miranda because it “protects the least vulnerable 
suspects and fails to protect the most vulnerable”). 
240 See supra text accompanying notes 195–202. 
241 Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and 
Irrational Action, 74 DENVER U. L. REV. 979, 985–86 (1997). 
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duplicity, for there is rarely a significant advantage for the suspect in self-
incriminating to the police.242 
Moreover, there seems little disagreement among commentators that 
Miranda actually shielded the police from the level of scrutiny that they 
faced in the pre-Miranda era243 because the courts have viewed the waiver 
as effectively a consent by the suspect for the police to use even tactics that 
verge into coercion.244 This concern can become overblown, as empirical 
evidence suggests that police only rarely use strategies that would actually 
violate due process.245 Yet, the evidence does suggest that police 
interrogation in general is no more respectful than it was immediately 
before Miranda.246 And, did we want Miranda law actually to invite the 
police to act as dishonestly and aggressively as before? 
Miranda doctrine also invited police officers to disrespect the law 
because it purported to  give them conflicting duties but did not require 
them to honor their duty to suspects zealously.247 The job of the 
interrogating officer is to try to get the accused to confess.248 Miranda 
implicitly purported to require the officer to help the accused not to 
confess.249 Yet, the doctrine seemed almost a pretext given the lack of 
clarity about just what comments and behaviors the officer could employ to 
 
242 Part of the reason that talking will rarely help the suspect resolve his case favorably derives 
from evidence law. A suspect statement that the prosecution wants to introduce will fall within a 
hearsay exclusion or exception as a statement by the opposing party. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
However, when the defendant makes a favorable statement to the police and would like to offer it into 
evidence for its truth, the statement typically will constitute inadmissible hearsay. See, e.g., id. 
243 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
244 See supra text accompanying notes 195–202. 
245 See, e.g., Leo, supra note 1, at 282–83 (finding incidence of coercion during about two percent 
of interrogations). 
246 The Miranda Court claimed to eschew this outcome: “The requirement of warnings and waiver 
of rights is a fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary 
ritual to existing methods of interrogation.” 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). 
247 See Kamisar, supra note 21, at 35–36 (noting that “when we expect the police dutifully to notify 
a suspect of the very means he may utilize to frustrate them—when we rely on them to advise a suspect 
unbegrudgingly and unequivocally of the very rights he is being counted on not to assert—we demand 
too much of even our best officers”); Kuh, supra note 130, at 236 (“The first and most marked 
absurdity of Miranda is to expect police to give advice that will strip them of their ability to collect 
evidence.”). 
248 See, e.g., Wald et al., supra note 182, at 1554 (analyzing empirical study and suggesting that 
interrogators generally saw their job as “obtaining some kind of statement to present to the 
prosecutor”). 
249 See Caplan, supra note 103, at 1451 (noting that “[a] police warning” that is “delivered 
faithfully” will “encourage the suspect to withhold information”). 
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downplay the warnings and the waiver.250 Predictably, police officers have 
often viewed the warning and waiver requirements with scorn and 
minimized their importance to suspects.251 Interrogators often try to “create 
the illusion” that the suspect and the interrogators “share the same interest” 
and that waiver and “continued compliance” is “to the suspect[’s] 
advantage.”252 From the typical interrogator’s perspective, the Miranda 
warnings and waiver rules understandably are mere inconveniences to be 
disparaged rather than serious protections for the accused that deserve their 
veneration.253 Do we want to impose rules that are so easy for officers to 
compromise and that we all but explicitly invite them to undermine? 
The Miranda opinion also encouraged lower courts to speak 
mendaciously.254 It summoned them to declare the misguided, irrational, or 
inveigled decisions of arrestees to waive their rights and talk as sensible.255 
As long as the interrogator repeated the Miranda warnings, it did not matter 
that the advice they contained was befogging.256 The Miranda opinion 
implied that the warning made the decision to waive and talk well 
considered and rational.257 Thus, a subsequent statement by a suspect that 
he was willing to talk without a lawyer’s help, except in the most extreme 
 
250 See Kamisar, supra note 21, at 36. (“[I]s it the duty of the police to persuade the suspect to talk 
or persuade him not to talk? They cannot be expected to do both.” (quoting Brief of Edward L. Barrett, 
Jr. as Amicus Curiae at 9, People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361 (1965) (on rehearing))). 
251 See, e.g., LEO, supra note 2, at 128 (noting that “the strategies that American interrogators use 
to obtain signed waivers have, in effect, turned Miranda on its head”); Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 598 
(“[M]any interrogators are adept at using some combination of threats and inducements to convince 
suspects to submit to interrogation.”); Wald et al., supra note 182, at 1552 (empirical study after 
Miranda noting that interrogators often tried to convey that the warnings were a mere bureaucratic 
formality and that the suspect should tell them what happened). 
252 LEO, supra note 2, at 128. 
253 Id. at 124 (“Miranda has become a ‘manageable annoyance’—the anti-climax of custodial 
questioning—to American police . . . .”). 
254 See Kuh, supra note 130, at 235 (contending that, although “there is just no sound way of 
ordinarily finding an intelligent waiver by a defendant of his [F]ifth [A]mendment rights[,] . . . Miranda 
would have us believe there is such a thing”). 
255 See id. 
256 See supra notes 184–190 and accompanying text. 
257 The Court lacked any basis in existing Fifth Amendment doctrine to create a Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel during interrogation and to require that warnings apprise the suspect of that right. If one 
can accept that construction of the privilege, it is not a big step to accept that the Court could have 
required the actual appointment of counsel to assist the suspect in reaching a decision on waiver. It is 
also not a big additional step to accept that the Court could have even imposed a nonwaivable 
requirement that counsel be present to assist the defendant during any questioning. Given that the Court 
took the first step, its failure to take either or both of the latter two raises the question whether it was 
aiming for a practical compromise rather than conforming to a notion of what it thought the 
Constitution demanded. 
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circumstances, was a valid waiver.258 The fact that such a decision was 
“stupid” on its face259 was no basis to deny its validity.260 Further, the fact 
that such a huge proportion of suspects facing interrogation—roughly 
eighty percent261—were acting stupidly by waiving262 was no basis for 
lower courts to worry that the warnings might be confounding or that the 
police were acting begrudgingly in administering and commenting to 
suspects on them. Because the vast majority of waivers were highly stupid, 
there was little reason to try to categorize some as more stupid than others. 
Miranda, thus, functioned to promote and legitimize compelled waivers263 
by having lower courts participate in the subterfuge of calling them 
“knowing[] and intelligent[].”264 Do we want the courts to so blind 
themselves to the meaning of words in justifying their decisions? 
2. Undermining Miranda Without Honoring the Privilege.—In 
largely eviscerating Miranda, the post-Warren Court at least modestly 
reduced some of the perverse consequences of the doctrine. By making 
waivers easier and assertions harder,265 the post-Warren Court reduced the 
ability of random suspects among the vast array of confused ones to gain 
the benefits associated with an invocation of rights. Likewise, by allowing 
impeachment with evidence from Miranda violations, restricting the 
definitions of “custody” and “interrogation,” limiting the fruits doctrine, 
 
258 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). The exceptional circumstances in which the 
Court has declared a purported waiver invalid involve efforts by the police to continue interrogation 
after the defendant had clearly and unambiguously asserted his right to counsel. See, e.g., Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 479–80 (1981). 
259 Kuh, supra note 130, at 234–35 (concluding that a suspect’s “act in talking intentionally is a 
stupid, non-intelligent act”). 
260 In his dissent in Miranda, Justice White suggested that any decision to waive after Miranda 
would seem as irrational as any decision to answer an unwarned statement had been in the pre-Miranda 
era: “But if the defendant may not answer without a warning a question . . . without having his answer 
be a compelled one,” he asked, “how can the Court ever accept his negative answer to the question of 
whether he wants to consult his retained counsel or counsel whom the court will appoint?” 384 U.S. at 
536 (White, J., dissenting). These comments—ironic ones, given that Justice White dissented—
suggested that the warnings the majority required, at least when administered by police officers in the 
context of custodial interrogation, could not produce the kind of waiver that should count as voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent. 
261 See Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 603–04. 
262 See, e.g., LEO, supra note 2, at 124 (“[T]he Miranda ritual makes almost no practical difference 
in American police interrogation.”); Wald et al., supra note 182, at 1563 (in an empirical study 
conducted shortly after the Miranda decision: “No support was found for the claim that warnings 
reduce the amount of “talking.”). 
263 See supra text accompanying notes 184–194. 
264 384 U.S. at 444. 
265 See supra notes 168–173 and accompanying text. 
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and imposing the public safety exception,266 the Court reduced the ability of 
cunning recidivists to avoid aggressive police interrogation that might 
cause them to self-incriminate. If we accept that the original Miranda 
doctrine dished out benefits to a few suspects who were no more entitled to 
them than many others, we should commend the post-Warren Court for at 
least modestly reducing the unfairness.267 
The post-Warren Court also has helped slightly reduce the need for 
mendacity by lower courts confronting Miranda claims, even if it has not 
done much to reduce dishonorable behavior by police interrogators. The 
Court’s rulings narrowing the application of Miranda268 reduce the need for 
lower courts to disingenuously declare compelled suspect waivers as 
“knowing and intelligent,” allowing the lower courts to rule for the 
government on alternative grounds. Decisions of the post-Warren Court 
that allow impeachments and restrict fruits exclusions after even conceded 
Miranda violations269 provide a similar benefit. 
The problem with the rulings of the post-Warren Court on Miranda is 
that they do not honor the Fifth Amendment privilege. Should we criticize 
the general demolition of Miranda on this basis? Given the benefits of what 
the post-Warren Court has accomplished in modestly reducing perverse 
consequences, there is little reason to say that Miranda doctrine today is 
worse than it was originally. However, if the goal is to find a way to both 
honor the privilege and encourage suspect admissions, current Miranda 
doctrine, like the original, fails miserably. 
B. A Pro-Confessional Critique of Reform Proposals 
Conventional proposals for reform also would achieve poor results 
because they, like Miranda, accept that the dilemma must concern which 
arrestees should benefit from doctrines that aim to prevent or suppress 
 
266 See supra notes 153–165, 167 and accompanying text. 
267 The post-Warren Court has fortified Miranda doctrine in one respect, however, that empowers 
the most cunning suspects. As we have seen, the Court has given the strongest Miranda protection to 
the suspect who, after receiving the warnings, clearly invokes the right to counsel. See supra notes 176–
177 and accompanying text. If that person can keep asking unambiguously for a lawyer in the face of 
police efforts to elicit an admission, he may benefit. The suspect may cause the police to cease the 
interrogation, which may allow him to avoid making an admission that he otherwise would have made 
and that could then have been used for impeachment purposes at trial or to find other admissible 
evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 153, 157–165. The Court has not effectively explained 
why an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel—as opposed to a clear or even equivocal 
assertion of the right to silence—should confer the added shelter. The protection given those who 
clearly invoke the right to counsel arguably operates as a semi-secret doctrine that the most well-versed 
and emotionally sturdy suspects can use to shield themselves. 
268 See supra notes 154–156 and accompanying text. 
269 See supra notes 153, 157–165 and accompanying text. 
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admissions elicited through custodial interrogation.270 Yet, if virtually every 
such admission is “compelled” under the privilege, we cannot achieve a 
good compromise by focusing on prevention and suppression. Any effort to 
prevent or suppress all or even most of those admissions will be 
unpalatable because of the perception that they are generally too important 
in securing convictions of the guilty. At the same time, any attempt to use 
doctrine to filter out only a few of them to prevent or suppress will seem 
arbitrary and will likely produce perverse incentives. 
1. Adjustments to Miranda Doctrine.—Proposals that focus on 
tinkering with Miranda doctrine cannot escape this conundrum. Consider, 
for example, claims that the Court should improve the Miranda warnings 
so that they actually help custodial suspects with their decision whether to 
waive and talk.271 How helpful should the revised warnings be? Do we want 
all suspects to understand that speaking with the police is virtually never 
their best option? Or do we want the ill-informed suspects to be only 
slightly less confused than they are with the current warnings so that they 
will mostly still agree to talk? There is no good choice between these 
options. One honors the privilege but at the expense of almost entirely 
eliminating custodial admissions as a tool for helping obtain criminal 
convictions. The other generally fails to honor the privilege and does so 
according to arbitrary rules that will still encourage police to downplay the 
warnings and the lower courts to classify many compelled and confused 
waivers as knowing and intelligent. 
2. Electronic Recording of Interrogations.—Requiring electronic 
recording is also not a good solution to the dilemma, because that approach 
will greatly underenforce the privilege. Electronic recording may produce 
modest benefits for criminal suspects in terms of limiting extreme police 
coercion and ensuring accurate information about what procedures the 
police followed and what verbal statements the suspect actually made.272 
Yet, the most fundamental problem with regulation under the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is not the absence of information about precisely 
what happened during the interrogation process273 but our willingness to 
ignore the obvious: a well-informed, nondisabled, nonbefuddled criminal 
 
270 See supra Section II.B. 
271 See supra text accompanying notes 207–208. 
272 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 995–96. But see Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 606–07 (questioning 
whether videotaping would yield any significant benefits from the perspective of those in the “Miranda-
is-a-failure camp”). 
273 See Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 606–07 (noting that “there is little empirical evidence” that 
“coercion during interrogation is common” or that “credibility disputes are common in litigation about 
custodial interrogation”). 
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suspect in police custody would rarely agree to talk.274 Only by obscuring 
that reality can the law purport to protect vulnerable suspects while also 
making their statements to the police generally admissible against them.275 
Electronic recording would probably have, at best, modest impact in 
preventing or excluding suspect statements because it would tell us little 
about the fear, anxiety, confusion, and irrationality in the suspect’s mind.276 
It is not a bad idea from the prosecution’s perspective,277 and I am not 
against it. However, electronic recording does little to address the central 
conundrum raised by Miranda. While it will not greatly increase the 
proportion of statements that courts suppress, it will also not do much to 
honor the privilege. 
3. Reforms Involving Defense Counsel or Magistrates.—Reforms 
that would require the presence of defense counsel prior to and during 
police interrogation or demand that a judicial officer conduct or supervise 
any custodial interrogation also cannot escape the problem.278 To the extent 
that these approaches would honor the privilege by virtually eliminating 
suspect admissions and their fruits, they could carry a high price in terms of 
lost convictions.279 In a significant number of cases, the government would 
need a custodial admission from the defendant, or, at least the fruits of the 
statement, to meet its difficult burden at trial.280 For this reason, the cost of 
 
274 See Kuh, supra note 130, at 234–35. 
275 As we have seen, concluding that police interrogation that produces an admission generally 
involves such “compulsion” requires little information about the details of the particular interrogation 
session. See supra text accompanying notes 124–134. 
276 The idea that the privilege required “free and rational choice” reflected concern with the 
pressure imposed on the mental processes of almost all detainees facing custodial police interrogation, 
rather than with unusual police misconduct or unusual vulnerability by a particular suspect. See supra 
text accompanying notes 96–97. 
277 See Duke, supra note 143, at 569–72 (discussing the benefits to the prosecution of video-
recording of interrogation sessions). 
278 See supra text accompanying notes 209–219. 
279 Before the Court decided Miranda, there was debate about the extent to which suspect 
admissions mattered, but some commentators concluded that in a large majority of cases, they were 
unimportant. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS, 156–57 (1983) (noting a study in 
the Brooklyn prosecutor’s office that prosecutors had given notice that they planned to use confessions 
as evidence in only 8.6% of their cases). In the modern era, commentators still vigorously contest the 
extent to which suspect admissions (and, thus, Miranda rules) matter. Compare, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & 
Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on 
Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1132 (1998) (“Miranda may be the single most damaging 
blow inflicted on the nation’s ability to fight crime in the last half century.”), with Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 
90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 547 (1996) (“For all practical purposes, Miranda’s empirically detectable net 
damage to law enforcement is zero.”). 
280 See, e.g., Inbau, supra note 226, at 16–17; Kuh, supra note 130, at 239–40. 
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such reforms in hampering law enforcement seems exorbitant. Perhaps 
even the Warren Court agreed. Commentators had suggested these 
approaches before Miranda,281 and the Miranda majority could have 
required the presence of defense counsel as a condition for any Fifth 
Amendment waiver by a custodial suspect.282 That it did not do so raises the 
question whether it thought the price too high.283 
4. Reliance on a Reinvigorated Due Process Standard.—Returning 
to a fortified due process test of voluntariness alone also cannot solve the 
Miranda predicament. Perhaps such an approach284 could do more to honor 
the privilege than current Miranda doctrine does. Yet, under any 
conceivable circumstances, the number of suspect admissions that this 
reform would prevent or suppress would still pale compared to the large 
number of suspect admissions produced through custodial interrogation. 
The reform proposals do not call for the Court to radically change the due 
process test.285 Instead, they propose essentially that, without the consent to 
coercion provided by a Miranda waiver, lower courts would more carefully 
scrutinize police behavior to determine whether it appears unduly 
coercive.286 It is not clear how to define what courts should do better.287 But, 
this approach would, at best, do only marginally more than current 
interrogation doctrine to prevent and suppress suspect admissions. Thus, 
while not extremely anticonfessional, it does not honor Miranda’s view 
that custodial police interrogation involves inherent compulsion under the 
privilege.288 
 
281 See supra note 216. 
282 At oral argument in Miranda, the Court questioned counsel about whether the suspect should 
have a nonwaivable right to the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to waive his right against 
compelled self-incrimination. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 84, at 528–29 (quoting transcript of oral 
argument). Moreover, the Court was not feeling bound by traditional views of the Fifth Amendment and 
waiver doctrine and, in that sense, could have imposed such a requirement or, at least, imposed a 
requirement that consultation with counsel occur before any waiver of Fifth Amendment rights. What 
the Court actually did in Miranda was itself a novelty—create a Fifth Amendment right to counsel as a 
purported prophylactic protection for the privilege and require a warning as to that newly invented 
prophylactic. 
283 See Arenella, supra note 213, at 384 (“To avoid this law enforcement nightmare, the Court 
compromised by permitting waivers of Miranda rights before consultation with counsel.”). 
284 See supra notes 220–224 and accompanying text. 
285 See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 220, at 504; Weisselberg, supra note 38, at 1596. 
286 See, e.g., Weisselberg, supra note 38, at 1596. 
287 See Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 608–11. 
288 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
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IV. A PRO-CONFESSIONAL PROPOSAL: USING CONCESSIONS TO 
REWARD SUSPECT ADMISSIONS TO THE POLICE 
This Part proposes an alternative approach to regulating police 
interrogation that accepts the Miranda Court’s view of “compulsion”289 but 
does not assume that we must honor the privilege by preventing or 
suppressing suspect admissions. I propose instead legislated sentencing 
concessions, meaning reductions in sentence severity,290 applied broadly to 
the group of suspects who self-incriminate to the police. I also propose that 
police advise suspects of the concessions. I contend that the concessions 
along with the advice would help incentivize suspects to waive their rights 
and talk, reduce the need for the police to employ deceitful or abusive 
interrogation tactics, and enable courts to speak more openly and candidly 
than current law permits about the problem of compulsion in the 
interrogation process. 
A. The Basis for Broadly-Applied Legislated Concessions 
Sentencing concessions can help states achieve a stable and sensible 
compromise between respecting the Fifth Amendment privilege and 
administering the criminal law. As Part III demonstrated, regulation that 
involves prevention and suppression of suspect admissions can never 
achieve such a compromise. The cost of preventing or suppressing 
compelled suspect admissions across the board is too high, and yet there 
are severe problems with trying to limit a remedy to only a few of the many 
compelled admissions. The cost to states of sentencing concessions is much 
less than that of prevention or suppression of suspect admissions. 
Sentencing concessions also provide a benefit that prevention or 
suppression does not because advice about them can encourage suspects to 
self-incriminate without the need for police aggression. These factors make 
applying sentencing concessions broadly across the group of persons who 
self-incriminate to the police more acceptable than the conventional 
remedies. 
 
289 See supra Section I.B. 
290 The nature of the concession I propose would depend on the nature of criminal sentencing in the 
jurisdiction and on the sentence that would otherwise apply in the particular case. In cases in which the 
judge would prescribe a fixed period of incarceration, the concession would reduce the period. In cases 
involving the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, or life imprisonment, the concession 
would, respectively, protect the defendant from the death penalty, make the defendant parole eligible, or 
at least advance the defendant’s parole eligibility date. In a jurisdiction in which the judge prescribed an 
incarceration range, the concession would reduce both numbers, making the defendant parole eligible 
sooner and limiting his maximum potential period of incarceration. See infra Section IV.C. 
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This approach is not cost-free to states, but the cost need not be 
exorbitant. Sentencing concessions would result in some reductions in 
criminal sentences on a widespread basis. Those reductions would 
constitute a sacrifice in the efforts of a state to achieve its otherwise 
optimal level of law enforcement. However, the Fifth Amendment privilege 
necessarily conflicts with the goal of achieving maximum law enforcement 
at the lowest cost to the state. Honoring the privilege requires the state to 
sacrifice something in its efforts.291 At the same time, we will see that the 
concessions that I propose would only modestly reduce the sentence 
imposed.292 
The proposal also involves sacrificing something in the way of 
honoring the Fifth Amendment. The privilege forbids the use against the 
defendant in a criminal case of his compelled statements.293 Given the 
Miranda view of compulsion,294 providing a sentencing concession would 
not fully honor this proscription, at least in cases in which, in addition to or 
in lieu of advice about the concession, the police have employed deceit or 
other psychological pressure.295 In such cases, suppression often should 
occur but will not under existing Miranda doctrine.296 A sentencing 
concession will only partially compensate a suspect in such a case because 
it is less of a reward than prevention or suppression of the admission. 
Nonetheless, it is substantially more reward than a suspect currently 
receives for self-incriminating. 
B. Why Not a Supreme Court Pronouncement? 
A system of concessions and advice would not only help honor the 
Constitution but also reduce the perverse consequences of existing doctrine 
on police interrogation. It would help offset the advantage that current law 
confers on experienced suspects who decline to cooperate. Suspects who 
cooperate would usually receive the concession, something those who 
refuse to talk would forego. A system of concessions could also ameliorate 
the tendency of police officers to employ deceit and psychological 
aggression to elicit admissions from suspects. Police officers could instead 
employ truthful advice about the availability of the concession to help elicit 
 
291 There may be alternative methods through which a state could achieve a compromise. I 
advocate sentencing concessions because they are already accepted as part of the plea-bargaining 
process throughout the country. See infra note 320 and accompanying text. 
292 See infra Section IV.C.3. 
293 See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). 
294 See supra Section I.B. 
295 See supra Section I.B. 
296 See supra Section II.A. 
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waivers and admissions. Finally, a system of concessions would enable 
courts to speak more forthrightly than current law permits about the 
interrogation process. Courts at least would have some basis to justify a 
decision of a suspect to waive his rights and self-incriminate as rational and 
intelligent if the police truthfully advised him in advance of the sentencing 
concession. 
The compromise of constitutional rights that the proposal embodies 
helps explain why I propose its promulgation through legislation rather 
than Supreme Court pronouncement. The fact that the proposal would not 
completely vindicate the privilege would not necessarily bar its 
implementation by the Court as a constitutional mandate. After all, 
Miranda itself implemented a compromise in enforcing the privilege, and 
one with greater flaws than the plan I propose.297 However, my proposal is 
a transparent tradeoff, while Miranda was not generally understood at the 
outset—even by those who accepted its view of compulsion—as having 
seriously cheated the privilege.298 The later characterization of Miranda by 
liberals as a balancing of competing interests frequently was not a 
compliment,299 and acknowledgement of the compromise nature of the 
decision has not stopped its unraveling as constitutional doctrine.300 Among 
conservatives on the Court, any recognition that the opinion had 
implemented some form of tradeoff301 was not seen as a reason to avoid 
undermining it further, but rather as grounds to conclude that it had not 
 
297 For the view that the original opinion represented a compromise, see Arenella, supra note 213, 
at 384; Kinports, supra note 173, at 376–77; George C. Thomas, III, “Truth Machines” and 
Confessions Law in the Year 2046, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 215, 218 (2007). For the view that the 
changes imposed by post-Warren-era majorities on the Court represent a different compromise, see 
supra Section III.A. 
298 Originally, “[m]any thought that Miranda made lawful interrogation almost impossible.” Duke, 
supra note 143, at 555. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he thrust of the new rules is to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, 
and ultimately to discourage any confession at all.”); id. at 536 (White, J., dissenting) (asserting that the 
Court “expects . . . that the accused will not often waive the right [to counsel]; and if it is claimed that 
he has, the State faces a severe, if not impossible burden of proof.”). For one of the articles that 
contributed to the later understanding, see Seidman, supra note 13, at 744 (describing Miranda as “a 
retreat from the promise of liberal individualism brilliantly camouflaged under the cover of bold 
advance”). For an early article that noted the seeming tension between what the Miranda Court said the 
privilege guaranteed and the protections the Court seemed to provide, see Kuh, supra note 130, at 234 
(contending that “there can be no truly ‘intelligent’ waiver” of the privilege). 
299 See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 13, at 747 (asserting that “the Court ended up contributing to the 
smugness and self-satisfaction that are the main enemies of growth and reform”). 
300 See supra Section II.A. 
301 See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986) (contending that the Miranda decision 
struck a “balance between society’s legitimate law enforcement interest and the protection of the 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights”). 
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hewn to any firm constitutional principle.302 This history suggests that the 
Court should not declare the existence of a constitutional principle but 
institute a safeguard that obviously short-changes it. 
The Court also has gone too far with Miranda at this point—especially 
after purporting to reaffirm it in the Dickerson decision in 2000303—to now 
mandate a substantially different approach under the privilege. Pursuit of 
the Miranda path for so long has undermined the ability of the Court to 
credibly claim that the Fifth Amendment privilege commands a different 
course. In this sense, Miranda doctrine has not been merely a failure on its 
own terms but destructive of any opportunity for the Court to do something 
more constructive to regulate police interrogation under the Constitution.304 
A state legislature has much more flexibility than the Court to institute 
a plan that supplements existing doctrine on police interrogation. The 
legislature can act in service of its state constitutional equivalent to the 
Fifth Amendment privilege. It can act to fulfill its notion of what 
constitutes good policy in regulating police interrogation. And, it can act on 
the view that the Supreme Court has underenforced the federal privilege 
and that there is a way for state legislation to help fill the gap. This latter 
position would merely acknowledge that the Supreme Court sometimes 
cannot fully enforce the Constitution due to its institutional limitations but 
that these inhibitions do not reflect the substantive boundaries of the 
document.305 Consistent with this view, the conclusion of the Court that the 
privilege demands little from government to protect suspects does not 
foreclose a state legislature from concluding that it demands more.306 A 
state legislature would be affording the privilege “heightened protection,” 
and “the same justifications for searching judicial review do not apply” in 
that circumstance as when a legislature affords “less protection . . . than the 
courts deem warranted.”307 The legislature has the authority to “provide 
 
302 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654–56 (1984) (creating a public safety exception to 
Miranda); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 451–52 (1974) (declining to exclude the testimony 
of a witness discovered by eliciting statement from defendant in violation of Miranda). 
303 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); supra note 163. 
304 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 1, at 978 (“That is the real cost of Miranda—a bad regulatory 
scheme removed all possibility of developing a good one, a state of affairs that Dickerson ensures will 
continue.”). 
305 See Sager, supra note 35, at 1214–15. 
306 The Miranda Court asserted that the decision “in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket 
which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect.” 384 U.S. 436, 467 
(1966). The Court “encourage[d] Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for 
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient 
enforcement of our criminal laws.” Id. 
307 See Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who 
Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 129 (2004). 
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stronger protections,” particularly when, as here, there would be no 
“competing claims to constitutional protection” that would conflict with the 
legislation.308 
While a state legislature that accepts the Miranda Court’s view of 
compulsion309 arguably is bound to enact a system such as sentencing 
concessions to honor the privilege, the obligation is best understood as 
moral rather than legal.310 There is no enforceable duty by a legislature to 
act in these circumstances, unless a state court determined that the absence 
of such concessions violated state law.311 Nonetheless, for legislators who 
believe that Miranda properly declared the privilege to protect free and 
rational choice,312 the moral obligation is clear.313 They should try to help 
redress the Supreme Court’s underenforcement of the privilege. They can 
do so in an effective way by creating a system of sentencing concessions, 
with advice to suspects, to reward those who self-incriminate. 
C. Implementing the Concessions 
There are three central questions that a legislature would confront in 
creating a system of concessions. The first concerns which suspects should 
qualify based on their circumstances. The second concerns what kinds of 
statements should qualify. The third concerns how to define the amount of 
the concession. On the first question, I recommend that concessions go 
only to those suspects who have been seized under Fourth Amendment 
standards and who reasonably conclude that they are speaking with a 
government agent. On the second question, I urge that, within this group, 
concessions go to everyone who makes a statement to the police that the 
state would use against them at trial. Use of the fruits would amount to use 
of the statement for these purposes. Regarding the third question, I 
 
308 See id. at 129 n.98. 
309 See supra Section I.B. 
310 There would be no duty to act if legislators conclude that Miranda was materially wrong about 
the meaning of “compulsion” and that it actually equates with “coercion” for due process purposes. 
However, as Professor Kamisar has urged, this view is not sensible. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 
84, at 547 (noting that “compulsion” and “coercion” have “different connotations when one takes into 
account their different bases, legal history and legal meaning”). 
311 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E. 2d 548, 550 (Mass. 1985) (mandating under state 
constitution a test of probable cause for searches that was more favorable to criminal defendant than the 
test mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court under the federal Constitution). 
312 See supra Section I.B. 
313 A state legislature that agrees with the Miranda view of compulsion arguably could conclude 
that the Supreme Court erred in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964), in incorporating the privilege 
against the states. Professor Dripps has argued that the Court’s ruling in Malloy was wrong. See Dripps, 
supra note 4, at 728–30. Nonetheless, such a legislature could still conclude that good policy reasons 
remain to implement a system of concessions for confessions. 
HOWE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2016 11:29 AM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
952 
recommend a percentage reduction from the sentence that the defendant 
otherwise would have received, but acknowledge that legislatures would 
have to decide how much the proportional concession should be. In the 
following Sections, I elaborate on my answers to these questions. 
1. Concessions in What Circumstances?—The issue of who should 
receive concessions embodies the problem of what circumstances 
surrounding a statement should matter. A state could conclude that 
concessions should apply only where Miranda protection currently would 
apply. On that view, only a statement made by a person in Miranda 
“custody”314 who faces Miranda “interrogation”315 would qualify. A state 
could justify this limited application of concessions on grounds that these 
aspects of Miranda doctrine appropriately define when concerns about 
compulsion under the privilege become significant. 
Alternatively, a state could expand the use of concessions to cover 
some persons who do not fall within Miranda’s coverage but whom the 
state wants to encourage to waive their rights and talk. This group could 
include some not in Miranda custody—for example, persons who are 
temporarily detained or persons who are talking to the police but who could 
on their own choice terminate the encounter. A state could also expand 
coverage to include arrested suspects who make statements not in response 
to interrogation but still in response to elicitation efforts by government 
agents—such as to inquiries by undercover officers posing as cellmates or 
by cellmates working as government agents. 
Although my proposal could prompt reasonable disagreement, I urge 
coverage somewhat broader than Miranda doctrine would confer. I propose 
that the concessions apply to all persons who have been seized under 
Fourth Amendment standards, which would include persons whom the 
police have either arrested or, unlike under Miranda, temporarily 
detained.316 I also would not require interrogation under Miranda doctrine 
to trigger eligibility for the concessions. However, I would require that one 
in the detainee’s position reasonably have concluded that he was speaking 
to a government agent. There also would be no exception to the application 
of concessions in “public safety” situations, unlike for Miranda.317 I believe 
this approach would reward the suspect who self-incriminates in most 
situations in which we could conclude that compulsion would operate. This 
 
314 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
315 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
316 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (holding that a temporary, investigatory stop 
constituted a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
317 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
HOWE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2016 11:29 AM 
110:905 (2016) Moving Beyond Miranda 
953 
approach would also encourage suspects in detention to talk before the 
police employed “interrogation,” which the Miranda Court found to risk 
compulsion.318 
2. Concessions for Which Statements?—To implement concessions, 
a state must also confront questions about which statements warrant them. 
Should a state only reward a remorseful and complete confession to the 
most serious charge ultimately leveled against the suspect? Sometimes, 
suspects admit only to lesser crimes than those they actually have 
committed or to only some of the crimes for which they are factually 
guilty. Likewise, suspects sometimes claim innocence but give a statement 
that tends to incriminate them because the government can easily disprove 
it and thereby show consciousness of guilt. Which kinds of statements 
warrant a sentencing concession? 
I advocate a simple rule that aims primarily to honor the rights of 
suspects under the Fifth Amendment privilege by compensating them for 
statements they have made in response to police compulsion. I contend that 
the concessions can sometimes serve further valuable ends when the police 
inform suspects of them. In such cases, the concessions would sometimes 
incentivize suspects to waive their rights and self-incriminate, and, in a 
smaller number of cases, even encourage suspects to confess. However, the 
principal goal is to honor the Fifth Amendment. Consequently, I propose 
that concessions adhere for any statement (or the fruits of any statement) 
that the prosecution would use against the suspect at his trial. 
This standard would often mean that defendants who waive their 
rights and speak to the police would have some leverage to claim a 
concession. Almost all criminal convictions result from a plea bargain.319 A 
defendant who talks to the police could frequently assert during plea 
negotiations with the prosecutor that his statement to the police would be 
used against him if the case were to proceed to trial. The prosecution could 
deny this, but the problem would usually resolve itself without extended 
litigation. The trial judge could render a ruling on the question at the plea 
bargain hearing, and the defendant’s acceptance of the bargain could be 
deemed to foreclose any further challenge. After all, the defendant could 
make the prosecutor’s promise to represent to the court that defendant had 
made a self-incriminating statement to the police and that the government 
 
318 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
319 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”). 
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would have used it at trial a condition of the bargain.320 Even if the 
prosecutor would not make such a promise as part of the bargain,321 the 
court should ask the prosecutor about it on the record at the plea bargain 
hearing when the government presents its factual basis for the guilty or no-
contest plea.322 The defendant could reject the plea bargain and go to trial if 
he did not believe the prosecutor. Under those circumstances, the judge 
could, except in unusual circumstances,323 properly rely on the prosecutor’s 
representations in deciding whether the concession should apply.324 
 
320 One might plausibly contend that prosecutors would sometimes strong-arm defendants who 
deserve the concession to forego it: “If you insist on claiming a concession, we are going to trial and 
I’m going to prove you guilty of a more serious offense, and you will go to prison for a lot more time.” 
I concede that this would happen sometimes. Yet several forces would generally operate to limit these 
tactics. For example, discretion remaining with the judge on sentencing after a conviction at trial could 
deter such behavior. Cf. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978–2003, 32 CRIME 
& JUST. 131, 206 (2005) (noting that, under the Minnesota sentencing guidelines, trial judges retain 
substantial sentencing discretion, which limits overcharging of crimes by prosecutors); Joseph S. Hall, 
Guided to Injustice?: The Effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on Indigent Defendants and Public 
Defense, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1331, 1355–56 (1999) (noting that, before federal sentencing guidelines 
reduced their sentencing discretion, federal judges, after a conviction at trial, “could act to remedy the 
prosecutor’s overcharging by recognizing the overcharging and correcting for it”). To the extent that the 
defendant who has been convicted after trial could show that he was browbeaten unjustly not to claim 
the concession during plea bargaining, the defendant could ask for, and might well receive, leniency 
over and above the concession from a judge who retained substantial sentencing discretion. In that 
scenario, the prosecutor’s tactics would backfire. Moreover, if the size of the concession given after a 
trial versus after a guilty plea were greater (and I contend that they should be engineered to be 
different), a prosecutor would generally be less inclined to refuse to acknowledge the propriety of the 
concession in the plea bargaining process, because the disparity in sentences between the two outcomes 
would be smaller. 
321 The prosecutor understandably would sometimes be unable to say with certainty what would 
happen at trial regarding reliance on a statement or its fruits. Yet, the legislature, or the courts through 
adjudication, could require the prosecutor to predict what would occur according to a lower standard 
than certainty—such as by a fair probability. 
322 Should we worry that prosecutors would respond deceitfully, delusively, or at least 
nonobjectively to the judge’s inquiry? I concede that this would happen sometimes. Nonetheless, I 
contend that, in a large proportion of cases involving defendants qualifying for the concession, the 
prosecutors would realize that they would have to use the statement or its fruits at trial and that they 
could not credibly deny the defendant’s claim. In other cases in which the defendant should qualify but 
in which it would be less obvious to the court, I believe that prosecutors would still often recognize the 
truth and report it accurately. The likelihood that inaccuracy on their part could later be revealed at a 
trial would provide some incentive to act with honesty and foresight. 
323 If the proffer presented by the government to support the factual basis for the guilty or no-
contest plea relied heavily on the suspect’s qualifying statement or the obvious fruits, the judge could 
still rule that the defendant deserved the concession despite the prosecutor’s assertions to the contrary. 
324 In a jurisdiction that allows bargaining for a specific sentence in addition to charge bargaining, a 
court could, in theory, leave it up to the parties to resolve through the bargaining process whether the 
defendant deserved the concession. However, the better course, for reasons discussed in a preceding 
note, would be for the judge to question prosecutors about whether they had granted a defendant the 
concession. The answers would help the judge determine whether to honor the plea bargain and, in 
unusual cases, determine whether the government had unjustifiably denied the concession. See supra 
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Likewise, if the case proceeded to trial, the prosecution would show its 
hand on whether it would admit the statement, which usually would resolve 
whether the concession applied. 
Under my proposed standard, there is only one situation in which a 
conviction based on a plea or trial usually would not resolve issues over 
whether a concession should apply. That is if the defendant made a 
statement and claims that the government introduced evidence at trial that 
was the fruit although it did not introduce the statement itself. The parties 
would usually have plea bargained to avoid the uncertainties over the 
outcome.325 But, in the case where bargaining failed and a trial conviction 
resulted, the judge would have to resolve the fruits issue. 
3. How Much of a Concession?—Defining the sentencing benefit 
that each qualifying defendant should receive might seem like an insoluble 
conundrum for legislators trying to implement a system of concessions. 
How much of a concession should a defendant charged with first-degree 
murder receive for an admission to the police? What if the conviction 
occurred after a guilty plea rather than after a trial? What if the plea were to 
a lesser offense instead of to the original charge? What if there were 
multiple charges but most were dropped as part of the bargain? One need 
not contemplate these kinds of questions long to realize that an approach 
focused on articulating specific reductions that would apply to each kind of 
conviction in every possible context would become complicated. Unless 
the legislator could articulate a relatively simple approach that would 
sensibly apply across the run of cases, the task of promulgating a workable 
concession system could seem too daunting. 
I contend that there are workable approaches that could apply broadly, 
although they require some inconsistency in the concessions granted to 
different defendants. Imagine an approach that focused on identifying a 
“one-size-fits-all” fixed-term reduction in incarceration periods. Assume a 
jurisdiction in which the judge sentences to a fixed term of incarceration 
rather than a minimum and maximum term. Assume further that a 
legislature specified that any defendant who qualified for a concession 
would receive a five-year reduction from the sentence that he otherwise 
would have received. This approach is simple, but it fails to acknowledge 
that a five-year reduction from a sentence of fifty years would carry far 
 
note 322. On the forms of plea bargaining employed in the United States, see LAFAVE ET AL., supra 
note 44, at 1000. 
325 See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1935 (1992) (“[P]arties bargain over the allocation of criminal punishment in order to reassign and 
thereby reduce the risks of an uncertain future . . . .”). 
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different implications than the same reduction from a sentence of five 
years. The same fixed reduction would seriously thwart the penological 
goals of the criminal justice system in the latter case although not in the 
former. 
Specifying various categories of crimes and corresponding fixed-term 
reductions could improve our hypothetical system but would still pose 
major challenges. To demonstrate, suppose the legislature required 
different fixed-term reductions for different tiers of crimes involving 
similar levels of seriousness. For example, the legislature could require a 
ten-year reduction for certain major felonies, a five-year reduction for 
medium-grade felonies, and a six-month reduction for the least serious 
felonies.326 The legislature could also impose adjustments to the size of the 
fixed-term concessions for convictions based on trials rather than on guilty 
pleas, to address the disparity in sentences that a court would otherwise 
impose in those differing situations. A workable system of this sort is not 
impossible to imagine. Yet, it would become complicated if the legislature 
tried to include more than a few of the distinctions that might seem 
warranted. 
I urge that a better approach would involve specifying a proportional 
reduction that a qualified defendant would receive from the sentence that 
the court otherwise would have imposed. This approach would be relatively 
simple and could help avoid seriously thwarting the penological goals of 
criminal sentencing. If the reduction were, for example, twenty percent, a 
fifty-year sentence would reduce to forty years while a five-year sentence 
would reduce to four years. If the jurisdiction were one that required the 
judge to articulate both minimum and maximum incarceration periods, both 
would be reduced by the proportional figure. A legislature might introduce 
some minor adjustments, such as for the proportional reduction that would 
apply after a conviction at trial versus after a conviction on a plea. 
However, the focus on proportional reductions already solves many of the 
problems that would adhere in a system with fixed-term concessions. 
A legislature implementing a concessions system should clarify that a 
qualifying defendant earns these reductions on top of any sentencing 
benefits that come to him from pleading guilty, accepting responsibility, or 
expressing contrition or remorse. Under current sentencing practices, a 
defendant will often receive some leniency for having timely pursued a 
guilty plea and perhaps, usually in connection with the plea, for showing 
 
326 I put aside the problem of crimes carrying the death penalty or life imprisonment for now but 
address it later. See infra paragraph following note 331. 
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remorse.327 However, defendants do not receive sentencing credit simply 
for having yielded to police compulsion and self-incriminated328: “I was the 
one who shot him, but it was in self-defense!” My proposal aims to 
compensate suspects who have yielded to police compulsion in any way 
that the government uses to its advantage. The concessions I propose do not 
reward full confessions topped off with an apology any more than false 
alibis that the government can easily destroy before a jury to show that the 
suspect is a liar and conscious of his own guilt. Thus, the concessions I 
urge do not “double count” for any conduct that current sentencing 
practices sometimes reward. 
At the same time, I reject the view that suspects typically can count on 
receiving a significant benefit (that they could not later have earned) even 
for a full-blown and tearful confession. The uncertainty that any benefit 
will accrue is surely part of the reason that one high-ranking former 
prosecutor conceded that the decision of a suspect to talk to the police is 
“rarely . . . intelligent.”329 The facts in Montejo v. Louisiana330 underscore 
the point. Jesse Montejo confessed to a murder in response to police 
compulsion, acceded to the police pressure that he lead detectives to the 
weapon, and, during the ride, wrote a letter of apology to the victim’s 
widow.331 Did this cooperation and remorse earn Montejo a concession? 
The prosecution used Montejo’s letter of apology to help secure his 
conviction for capital murder and his death sentence.332 The case 
underscores the very need for a concession system. Whether or not we also 
reward Montejo’s acceptance of responsibility and apology, we should 
compensate him, if we accept the Miranda Court’s view of the privilege, 
simply because the government compelled him to be a witness against 
himself. 
The Montejo case also raises another issue: What to offer in the way 
of concessions in capital cases or those where the defendant faces life 
 
327 Current federal Sentencing Guidelines, for example, provide for level reductions for a defendant 
who demonstrates “acceptance of responsibility.” See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) [hereinafter USSG]. Yet, these reductions do not adhere simply for 
having yielded to compulsion during police interrogation. For more on the application of USSG 
§ 3E1.1, see Alexa Chu Clinton, Comment, Taming the Hydra: Prosecutorial Discretion Under the 
Acceptance of Responsibility Provision of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1467, 
1474–83 (2012), and Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of Responsibility”: 
The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1510–42 (1997). 
328 See, e.g., USSG § 3E1.1. 
329 Kuh, supra note 130, at 233. 
330 556 U.S. 778 (2009). 
331 See id. at 781–82. 
332 Id. at 782. 
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imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment with parole? Reasonable 
people could disagree, but I urge some simple solutions. I recommend that 
the law state that the death penalty will not remain an option for the 
defendant who warrants the concession. If the next most serious penalty 
available is life imprisonment without parole, the defendant will receive 
that sanction. Likewise, if the defendant qualifies for a concession and 
would otherwise receive a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, he 
should receive a life sentence with the possibility of parole. Finally, if the 
defendant warrants a concession and would otherwise receive a sentence of 
life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, at least his parole 
eligibility date should advance by the proportional reduction. 
In jurisdictions with sentencing guidelines,333 concessions could, in 
theory, be made part of the guidelines. The federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
for example, appear in the form of a matrix system expressed in “levels.”334 
A particular kind of crime falls into a “base offense level.”335 From that 
point, the level for the defendant’s crime increases and decreases based on 
various articulated factors.336 In such a system, legislation could authorize 
the concession as part of the level-adjustment process. As for state 
sentencing guidelines, they all differ from the federal guidelines in their 
scoring approach or the level of granularity with which they articulate 
sentencing ranges.337 In these jurisdictions as well, adjustments in the 
guidelines could incorporate the concessions. 
To be mandatory, however, I contend that the concessions should 
generally appear as legislated rules that stand apart from sentencing 
guidelines. The federal Guidelines are advisory after United States v. 
Booker,338 even if federal district judges typically follow them. Most state 
sentencing guidelines are also not mandatory for sentencing judges.339 If the 
concessions are required in the case of a qualifying defendant, they should 
not appear as part of a mere advisory system. 
 
333 For a summary of various sentencing-guideline systems used in federal court and in some states, 
see MD. DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS. OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, SENTENCING GUIDELINES – 
MARYLAND AND NATIONWIDE 9–21 (2014) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES – MARYLAND AND 
NATIONWIDE]. 
334 See U.S SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENCING TABLE (2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2015/Sentencing_Table.pdf [http://perma.cc/N8AC-FZFN]. 
335 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which 
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1988). 
336 See, e.g., USSG § 3E1.1. 
337 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES – MARYLAND AND NATIONWIDE, supra note 333, at 9–21. 
338 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
339 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES – MARYLAND AND NATIONWIDE, supra note 333, at 21. 
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In the end, legislatures in different jurisdictions would surely vary 
over how to define the concessions.340 I have urged an approach focusing 
on proportional reductions but do not contend that it is the only plausible 
methodology or that there is an optimal amount. A legislature could easily 
obtain advice on the problem from a wide array of experts, including those 
familiar with plea bargaining and sentencing practices in the particular 
jurisdiction. A legislature could also adjust the reductions as it deems 
appropriate over time. Defining the nature of workable concessions need 
not be a serious impediment to implementing the reform. 
D. Advising Suspects About the Concession 
A system of concessions would also allow police interrogators to 
truthfully tell suspects that waiving their Fifth Amendment rights and 
talking could benefit them. Concessions would have value even without 
this advice. Concessions would properly compensate a suspect for the 
violation of his rights although he did not know of their existence when 
speaking to the police. This conclusion builds on the proposition that the 
Supreme Court has underenforced the privilege as it applies to police 
interrogation.341 Nonetheless, states could also provide the concessions to 
help ameliorate the problem of psychological abuse in police interrogation. 
By advising suspects in advance that waiving their rights and talking would 
carry a possible benefit, the police could legitimately encourage suspects to 
talk. Police could place less reliance on deceptive and intimidating tactics 
than they currently employ.342 
The interrogator should not mislead the suspect to his detriment, 
which means that she should not overstate the concession. The interrogator 
should speak in general terms to avoid making a false promise. 
Immediately following the Miranda warning, the interrogator could 
provide the following statement: 
While you have the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney, there 
may be an advantage to you in waiving those rights and speaking to the 
police. Should you make a statement that reveals your involvement in a crime, 
the law provides that you may receive a lower sentence than you would if you 
are found guilty of the crime and have not admitted your participation to us. 
 
340 Detailed discussion about how a legislature in a particular jurisdiction should implement such a 
concession system in conjunction with the jurisdiction’s approach to plea bargaining and to criminal 
sentencing is a fruitful topic for further commentary. 
341 See supra Section II.A. 
342 For a description of common current police interrogation tactics, see supra text accompanying 
notes 198–200, 252. 
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This advice does not promise more than the plan proposes, and it would 
likely cause some defendants to think rationally about talking to the police 
and confessing.343 Under current law, they generally have no rational basis 
to waive their rights and talk.344 
In some cases, suspects would ask the officer follow-up questions, but 
these inquiries need not cause significant problems. Generally, the officer 
would do best not to add additional statements about the assurance or size 
of the concessions. The officer could appropriately respond that she is not 
able to give further advice about the concession or that she is unsure how to 
answer a question accurately. 
Provision of the concession and the advice would not constitute 
improper compulsion in violation of the privilege, nor would it constitute 
coercion under due process, according to Supreme Court decisions on plea 
bargaining.345 In the plea negotiating context, a prosecutor may offer 
sentencing concessions designed to induce the defendant to waive the 
privilege and plead guilty.346 There are limits, particularly when the 
concessions come through legislation. In a decision that has never been 
overruled, the Court ruled that a legislature may not in a death penalty case 
provide that a guilty plea will avoid any possibility of the death sentence.347 
The Court has also suggested that, even in non-death penalty cases, 
legislation may not guarantee a defendant a lesser sentence after a non vult 
or nolo contendere plea—in a case where the specific statute barred guilty 
pleas—as opposed to after a trial.348 Nonetheless, the Court has found that 
legislation can at least make the defendant who pleads guilty eligible for a 
lesser sentence for which he would not be eligible after conviction at 
trial.349 The concessions plan that I propose conforms to this approach. The 
 
343 Should the warning more clearly articulate that something less than a full confession could 
entitle the suspect to receive a concession? A police officer could try to clarify more fully with 
examples and explanations just when the offender would or would not qualify for the concessions. 
However, the warning could quickly become complicated, and the officer could easily err. Also, the 
officer probably would want to encourage the full, truthful confession rather than, for example, saying, 
“Even if you just give us a false alibi that we can disprove, you may qualify for a lower sentence.” 
344 See supra text accompanying notes 127–134, 213. 
345 For discussion of these decisions, see WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 72, at 726–32. 
346 Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978) (finding due process not violated 
when prosecutor carries out threat to re-indict accused on more serious charges if he does not plead 
guilty to original charge). 
347 See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 571–72 (1968). 
348 See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 217–18 (1978) (upholding statute that permitted a 
judge to sentence a defendant to either life imprisonment or thirty years’ imprisonment after a non vult 
or nolo contendere plea but required a sentence of life imprisonment after a conviction at trial, and 
noting that the risk of life imprisonment was “not completely avoided” by a non vult plea). 
349 See id. at 218. 
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defendant is not guaranteed a lesser sentence for self-incriminating to the 
police. The proposed warning only tells him that he “may” receive a lower 
sentence. Moreover, in some cases involving self-incrimination, the 
prosecution would not introduce the statement or its fruits at trial, which 
would mean that the concession rule would not apply. Although the 
defendant in such a case would suffer no detrimental consequences from 
talking to the police, he would also gain nothing in the way of a sentencing 
reduction. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began by asking why the Miranda doctrine invites terrible 
behavior by criminal suspects, the police, and the courts. The explanation 
traces in some sense to the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled 
self-incrimination. However, I have argued that the perverse consequences 
also stem from the conventional view that prevention and suppression of 
suspect statements are the only ways that the legal system can honor the 
privilege. Based on that view, the Miranda Court felt the need to pursue a 
bad compromise. While acknowledging that almost all admissions elicited 
through custodial police interrogation are “compelled,” the Court 
promulgated doctrine that prevents or excludes only a few of them. Post-
Warren-era majorities on the Court have further eviscerated the doctrine to 
prevent or suppress even fewer suspect admissions. The arbitrary rules 
created not only underenforce the privilege but reward disproportionately 
recidivist criminals and invite dishonesty by police officers and artifice by 
courts. 
I have urged a supplemental system of sentencing concessions for 
custodial admissions, accompanied by advice to suspects. The concessions 
approach, like Miranda, represents a compromise between fully honoring 
the Fifth Amendment privilege and pursuing an optimal level of law 
enforcement. However, it would provide a better compromise than the one 
embodied in Miranda doctrine. It would reorient the remedy away from 
providing a major benefit for only a few suspects toward providing a 
modest sentencing concession broadly across the group of detainees who 
self-incriminate. Suspects would still face conviction and often a 
substantial sentence when their statements to the police tend to demonstrate 
their guilt. 
I have argued that states should implement this system through 
legislation. The Supreme Court has gone too far with Miranda doctrine to 
now abandon it in favor of an alternative approach to regulating 
confessions. State courts also have no authority to implement the system as 
a better interpretation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, although they 
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could adopt it to enforce their state constitutions. State legislatures can 
promulgate the system as an adjunct to constitutional doctrine, but the 
question is whether they have good reason given the price in reduced 
criminal sentences. 
I contend that the benefits of a concessions system would outweigh 
the costs, which I have urged as modest. First, there is the gain of honoring 
an underenforced Fifth Amendment privilege. This benefit may seem 
abstract, but it is important. And other benefits are more concrete. Do we 
want to encourage suspects—and mostly recidivists—to cover up their 
crimes? Or do we want to encourage them to admit them? Do we want to 
incentivize police officers to deceive suspects, or even lie about the 
strength of the government’s evidence (when the suspect often commits a 
crime by lying to the police)?350 Or do we want to give them a means to 
elicit suspect admissions through honest statements about concessions? Do 
we want to impel judges in case after case to call waivers “knowing” and 
“intelligent” that are patently irrational and stupid? Or do we want to give 
them a basis to speak more forthrightly about whether the decisions of 
suspects to talk are the kinds of choices they plausibly would make even 
with the assistance of counsel? For any legislature that aspires for a legal 
system that promotes dignity, integrity, and governmental legitimacy, the 
answers are reason enough to look for an alternative to Miranda. 
 
 
350 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (making it a felony carrying up to five years of imprisonment 
for lying or covering up “a material fact” in “any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, 
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States”). 
